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 Opening the Black Box: 
Internal Capital Markets and Managerial Power 
 
 
 
Abstract 
We analyze the internal capital markets of a multinational conglomerate to determine 
whether more powerful unit managers enjoy larger allocations. We use a new dataset of 
planned and actual allocations to business units to show that, although all unit managers 
systematically over-budget capital expenditures, more powerful and better connected 
managers obtain larger shares of cash windfalls and increase investment about 40% more 
than their less powerful peers. Results survive robustness tests and are not explained by 
differences in managerial abilities or an endogenous allocation of managers across units. Our 
findings support bargaining-power theories and provide direct evidence of a source of capital 
allocation frictions.  
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How do firms allocate resources across business units? Do units with better investment 
opportunities receive larger capital allocations and invest more? Do units run by more 
powerful or better connected managers enjoy bigger investment budgets? In this paper, we 
seek to answer these questions with direct evidence from a newly constructed dataset, drawn 
from the internal accounting system of a large multinational conglomerate, containing 
information about planned and actual capital allocations to business units.  
 The modeling of internal capital markets has made substantial progress. Stein (2003) 
and Maksimovic and Phillips (2007) provide comprehensive reviews of the bright and the 
dark sides of internal capital markets, aspects initially studied by Gertner, Scharfstein, and 
Stein (1994). The efficiency view of internal capital markets emphasizes the bright side. This 
view holds that capital allocation is the result of pooling internally generated cash flows and 
subsequently distributing funds optimally to units (Weston (1970), Williamson (1975), 
Matsusaka and Nanda (2002), Maksimovic and Phillips (2002)). In these models, capital 
allocation is determined mainly by the unit’s investment prospects. Through winner-picking 
methods, internal capital markets add value, as the firm makes larger allocations to units with 
greater investment opportunities (Stein (1997)). 
A second view highlights the dark side of internal capital markets. The origin of this 
idea can be traced back to Coase (1937) who suggested that power within a hierarchy may 
impact internal firm policies. The proponents of this view argue that units run by more 
powerful or better connected managers may get allocations larger than what is justified by the 
investment opportunities they provide (Meyer, Milgrom, and Roberts (1992), Scharfstein and 
Stein (2000), Rajan, Servaes, and Zingales (2000), Wulf (2009)). In these bargaining-power 
models, unit CEOs prefer larger capital allocations (for rent-seeking or empire-building 
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reasons) and wield influence in an attempt to obtain more funds for their units. Influence 
activities are costly and inefficient because resources are spent trying to affect allocations and 
because the resulting investment decisions may not be optimal.1 
   Although there has been theoretical progress in the modeling of internal capital 
markets, empirical evidence is scarce. The current situation is similar to that in the literature 
on internal labor markets, a literature described by Baker and Holmstrom (1995, p. 259) as 
being in a phase of “too many theories, too few facts” and in need of “studies of personnel 
records, supplemented by interviews and institutional facts.” As in that literature, Schoar 
(2002) and Maksimovic and Phillips (2002, 2007) also argue for the need to look within the 
corporation to understand governance structures and their connection to resource allocation 
and management decisions throughout the entity.2 In this paper, we take these 
recommendations with an approach similar to that in Baker, Gibbs, and Holmstrom (1994a, 
1994b), who use internal labor data from a large firm to test internal labor market theories. 
We put together new data for a multinational conglomerate and analyze in detail its capital 
allocation process and the means by which more powerful and better connected business-unit 
managers use the process to obtain larger allocations after cash windfalls at headquarters.3 
                                                 
1 Some inefficient internal capital markets models focus on the firm CEO as the source of the agency problem. 
These models predict that CEOs try to allocate more capital to units from which they can obtain higher private 
benefits of control (Stulz (1990)), expect future favors, or help them get entrenched (Shleifer and Vishny 
(1989)).   
2 The need to look within firms has also been recognized in the management accounting literature. Ittner and 
Larcker (2001, p. 396), for example, write that “greater use of detailed data from a single or small number of 
organizations is also recommended. [….] such studies may provide the only means for obtaining the quantity 
and level of data needed to answer many managerial accounting research questions.” 
3 Our approach to looking within the corporation is also taken by Gopalan, Nanda, and Seru (2007), who 
examine the means by which internal capital markets in Indian business groups help support financially weaker 
firms, by Cremers, Huang, and Sautner (2010), who look at capital allocation data in a banking group, and by 
Seru (2010), who looks at R&D productivity in conglomerates. 
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 Our analysis relies on two new databases. The first, drawn from the proprietary 
records of the internal management accounting system of the conglomerate, contains five 
years of data on planned (i.e., budgeted) and actual (i.e., realized) capital allocations for each 
of the firm’s twenty business units, which operate under five divisions. In addition to the data 
on capital expenditures, we collected data on planned and actual marketing and R&D 
expenditures, as well as on assets, sales, sales growth, EBIT, cash flows, and personnel. To 
our knowledge, this is the first such dataset used in the internal capital markets literature. 
Most of the variables in our dataset are rarely available even at divisional level.4 An 
additional advantage of our data is that it allows us to analyze individual business units. As in 
most other conglomerates, the divisions of our firm lack operating activities themselves and 
act mostly as organizational umbrellas for the underlying business units. Business units are 
the real centers of economic activity in the typical conglomerate: they originate budget 
requests, receive capital allocations, make investments, and initiate production. 
We complement this data with a second dataset of measures of managerial power and 
connections for the forty-three business-unit CEOs working at the conglomerate over the 
five-year period of our analysis. We construct six indices of managerial power and 
connections. An initial set of measures is based on management profile data from BoardEx 
and ZoomInfo, data we cross-check and complement with information from annual reports, 
social networking web pages, and a systematic web and newspaper search.5 These measures 
                                                 
4 Segment reporting rules such as US-GAAP (SFAS 131/ASC 280) and IFRS (IAS 14/IFRS 8) require firms to 
report divisional information only on assets, sales, liabilities, depreciation, income, and capital expenditures. In 
practice, firms do not publish data by business unit and do not provide information on their budgets or 
investment plans. See Villalonga (2004) for a discussion of additional potential problems of using divisional 
data to study internal capital markets. 
5 BoardEx data has been recently used in Cohen, Frazzini, and Malloy (2008), whereas ZoomInfo data is used in 
Cohen, Frazzini, and Malloy (2009). 
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proxy for managers’ career at the firm, their social network at the workplace, and the 
similarity of their personal profiles to that of the CEO.6 We also take a survey of business-
unit CEOs, a survey we designed ourselves, to put together a second set of measures of 
managerial power and connection. The survey, which contains both self-constructed 
questions and questions previously used in the management and sociology literature (Podolny 
and Baron (1997), Forret and Dougherty (2001, 2004)), makes it possible to construct 
measures capturing a unit manager’s networking activities and his or her connections to 
executive management.  
Before we look at the effects of managerial power on capital allocation, we analyze 
the firm’s financial characteristics and its investment behavior. Throughout the period of 
analysis, there is no indication that the firm is financially constrained or in need of cash to 
finance investment opportunities. The firm also exhibits characteristics similar to those 
documented for other conglomerates. Consistent with the numbers in Lang and Stulz (1994) 
and Berger and Ofek (1995), the conglomerate discount of our firm averages 15% over the 
sample period. The business units of the conglomerate also overinvest and show a sensitivity 
of investment to Tobin’s Q lower than that of matched stand-alone firms, as posited by 
Berger and Ofek (1995), Rajan, Servaes, and Zingales (2000), and Ozbas and Scharfstein 
(2010). These results suggest that the conglomerate may be exposed to frictions in internal 
capital allocation similar to those to which conglomerates analyzed in the aforementioned 
papers are exposed.  
                                                 
6 Several of these measures are similar to those used in papers such as those by Berger, Ofek, and Yermack 
(1997), Ryan and Wiggins (2004), Cohen, Frazzini, and Malloy (2008), Fracassi (2008), Landier, Nair, and 
Wulf (2009), and Bandiera, Barankay, and Rasul (2009). 
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For a better understanding of the causes of frictions in internal capital allocation, we 
start by analyzing the budget allocation process at our conglomerate. Bower (1970, p. 305) 
describes capital allocation within firms as a political process and argues that “top 
management must manage its influence on [such] political processes.” Similarly, Jensen 
(2003, p. 380) contains vivid descriptions of how power and negotiations influence the 
budgeting process. He writes that “the budgeting process frequently consumes six months of 
management time in negotiations, planning, and target-setting.” Our access to internal firm 
documents helps us open up this “black box” and provide a detailed picture of the stages of 
the allocation process and the role played by unit managers. During the budgeting stage, 
business-unit CEOs provide initial allocation plans negotiated through organized and 
extensive interaction with senior management before they are approved. Although the general 
unit budget is approved and investments below a threshold can be carried out, making large 
expenditures still requires additional justification and approval during the execution stage. 
But this final stage of the process is shorter and less formalized and it leaves more room for 
discretion and favors.   
The main contribution of our paper is that it documents empirically the role of 
managerial power and connections in this process and their effects on actual capital 
allocations. We provide some of the first empirical evidence on two main fronts. First, we 
compare approved planned capital allocations (i.e., budgets) and actual allocations and show 
that managers use the standardized budgeting process to build buffers into their budgets. 
Business-unit managers systematically over-budget capital expenditures and end up investing 
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less than their approved allocation nearly 85% of the time. These empirically documented 
findings corroborate previous research based on interviews and laboratory experiments.7   
Second, we show that, although all unit managers try to use their excessive capital 
budgets to justify additional spending, units run by more powerful and better connected 
managers obtain higher actual capital allocations at times of financial slack in the firm. To 
measure financial slack, we use the method of Blanchard, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer 
(1994), who analyze firms’ behavior after unexpected cash windfalls. During our sample 
period, the conglomerate experiences eight substantial cash windfalls resulting from the sale 
by headquarters of equity stakes in other companies whose lines of business are largely 
unrelated to those of the units.8 Although the business units did not consider the windfalls in 
their previously submitted and approved planned capital budgets, some of the additional cash 
is available, ex post, for their investments, thereby creating financial slack.   
Actual investment rates across all units increase on average by about 40% in quarters 
in which there are cash windfalls. But this increase is far from homogenous, and a large share 
of the variation is accounted for by the power and the connections of the units’ CEOs. For six 
different indices of power and connections, we find that more powerful unit managers get 
significantly larger shares of the windfalls for their own units and increase their actual 
investments on average 40% more than their peers do. These magnitudes are estimated after 
controlling for proxies for investment opportunities and unobserved business-unit 
heterogeneity. Results are robust to alternative specifications.  
                                                 
7 Dunk and Nouri (1998) provide a review of this literature. Studies using surveys include those by Onsi (1973), 
Merchant (1985), or Dunk (1993). More recently, Van der Stede (2000), for example, uses questionnaires to 
measure over-budgeting. Studies using laboratory experiments include Young (1985), Chow, Cooper, and 
Waller (1988), and Waller (1988) or Stevens (2002).  
8 The windfalls are very large: they are equivalent, on average, to 53% of the conglomerate’s annual cash flow 
and 252% of its annual capital expenditures. 
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An advantage of focusing on the effect of power and connections on the distribution 
of windfalls rather than on planned capital budgets is that it mitigates reverse causality 
problems; after all, it could be that historically high planned capital allocations could 
themselves be a source of intra-organizational managerial power. An additional advantage of 
our method is that by looking at the difference between actual and planned investment, we 
control for the investment opportunities of the units, opportunities that should be reflected in 
the planned capital budgets. A final advantage of our data is that it allows us to address two 
additional potential concerns. First, we show that the results are not driven by endogenous 
allocation of powerful managers to the units with best investment opportunities. Second, we 
provide evidence that our measures of power do not seem simply to proxy for managerial 
ability.  
An explanation consistent with our findings is that approval of investments is easier to 
come by when the conglomerate is awash in cash and planned budgets are not yet fully spent. 
Such approval is more likely for units run by more powerful and well-connected managers. 
We provide evidence of one of the channels through which powerful managers obtain such 
larger allocations. This evidence lends weight to bargaining-power theories, which posit that 
capital allocations are based partly on power and connections.  
Our results complement the work of Rajan, Servaes, and Zingales (2000), who show 
that diverse firms, which are more susceptible to power struggles, allocate more resources to 
units with few investment opportunities and that of Duchin and Sosyura (2010), who show 
that the influence of division managers affects investment efficiency and firm value. It is also 
related to that of Xuan (2009), who studies how job histories of CEOs affect capital 
allocations to divisions. Our paper likewise complements that of Graham, Harvey, and Puri 
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(2010), who survey CEOs and CFOs in an attempt to elucidate the factors affecting the 
distribution of capital across corporate divisions. Finally, we provide evidence corroborating 
several studies that describe the ways in which political activity, lobbying, and persuasion 
affect capital budgeting (Pfeffer and Salancik (1974), Covaleski and Dirsmith (1986), Hirst 
and Baxter (1993)) and the ways in which middle managers try to convince their superiors, 
on both formal and informal occasions, of their need for bigger budgets, and fight to wield 
influence over allocation decisions (Lukka (1988), Lumijärvi (1991)).   
 The paper is organized as follows. Section I describes the conglomerate, its capital 
budgeting process, and our planned and actual allocation data. This section also presents the 
evidence for systematic over-budgeting of capital needs. Section II presents our evidence on 
the effects of managerial power and connections on the allocation of cash windfalls. Section 
III analyzes the robustness of the results and discusses alternative explanations. Section IV 
concludes.  
 
I. The Conglomerate and its Capital Allocation  
 
A. Organizational Structure of the Conglomerate 
Our firm is a major international conglomerate with business around the world. It has 
production plants in more than fifteen countries on four continents and has more than 
100,000 employees. The organizational structure of the firm takes the multidivisional M-
form9 and the conglomerate operates with a headquarters, five product divisions, and twenty 
                                                 
9 The M-form structure involves “the creation of semi-autonomous operating divisions (mainly profit centers) 
organized along product, brand, or geographic lines” (Williamson (1981, p. 1555)). The alternative is a 
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business units (see Figure 1).10 Headquarters coordinates central corporate functions, 
especially corporate strategy, internal capital allocation, outside financing, M&A, investor 
relations, and legal affairs. It also holds and manages equity stakes in corporations outside the 
conglomerate. The executive board, chaired by the CEO, is located at headquarters and has 
the ultimate responsibility for the firm.11  
[FIGURE 1 HERE] 
The five product divisions beneath headquarters have no separate operating activities 
themselves and act as umbrellas under which the business units operate. The divisions cover 
five distinct industry sectors and are run by division CEOs who have no direct operating 
responsibility; instead, they coordinate the activities of the business units. As in most 
conglomerates, the business units are the real centers of economic activity within the firm; 
they are responsible for investment, production, and sales. All of the units do business 
beyond the borders of the country where the firm is headquartered. The number of business 
units in a division ranges from one to eight, as illustrated in Figure 1. The divisions and their 
business units have no access to the external capital market and hence cannot raise debt or 
equity. The division and business-unit managers are not part of the executive board.  
 
                                                                                                                                                        
centralized, functionally departmentalized or unitary (U-form) structure. The M-form was pioneered in large 
format by the US conglomerates Du Pont and Sloan. 
10 The conglomerate has two other business units which are not included in our analysis. Neither unit can be 
compared with the twenty other units in the sample. One of these two units is a pure consolidation unit, which 
aggregates miscellaneous activities. This unit does not participate in the planning process and does not have a 
consolidated budget. The other unit is a service unit that does not make investments. As neither was a real 
business unit, neither had a business-unit CEO over the entire sample period. Annual sales and total assets of 
each of these two units amount to less than 1% of the aggregate sales and assets of the other twenty units 
combined.  
11 The firm did not change its CEO during the sample period of our analysis. 
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B. Financial Characteristics of the Conglomerate 
To ensure that the conglomerate is similar to other big conglomerates, we compare a 
set of its financial variables with those of other large conglomerates. As comparison firms, 
we look at all non-financial conglomerates in the Dow Jones 30 and the Euro Stoxx 50.12 We 
do so also to show that our firm is unlikely to be financially constrained and in need of cash 
to finance investment by its units. Panel A of Table I shows that our conglomerate’s 
aggregate investment rate, calculated as capital expenditures over total assets, is similar to 
those of the median conglomerate in the Dow Jones 30 and the lower-end conglomerates in 
the Euro Stoxx 50. Apart from having relatively low leverage and high cash holdings, the 
conglomerate also has a relatively high dividend payout ratio. Its dividend was constant for 
the first three years of our sample and increased substantially in both 2005 and 2006. 
Furthermore, the firm initiated a share repurchase program in 2005 and paid out nearly to 
€1.4 billion to its shareholders. Taken together, these circumstances suggest that our firm is 
unlikely to be financially constrained. As argued in Hovakimian and Titman (2006), these 
considerations are important, as the cash windfalls, which we exploit in the next section, 
could be considered not exogenous to the business units’ investments if the firm were 
financially constrained.  
[TABLE I HERE] 
For a further comparison, we calculate the firm’s conglomerate discount. Using the 
method of Berger and Ofek (1995), we find that the conglomerate discount is 15% over the 
                                                 
12 For this comparison, we consider all non-financial firms that operate at least in two different segments as 
conglomerates. 
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sample period.13 This figure is comparable to those documented for other large US and 
European conglomerates (Berger and Ofek (1995), Lang and Stulz (1994), Hoechle et al. 
(2010), Glaser and Müller (2010)). In fact, our conglomerate comes close to matching the 13-
15% discount found for the average US conglomerate in Berger and Ofek (1995).  
In Panels B and C of Table I, we follow the classic papers in the internal capital 
markers literature and show some of the potential causes of such a discount. Instead of using 
divisional data, we use our more detailed business-unit information. Panel B compares the 
annual investment rates of the business units and those of matched stand-alone firms 
operating in the same industry as the units.14 We find that the business units of the 
conglomerate invest more than comparable stand-alone firms. The evidence is in line with the 
arguments in Jensen (1986) and Stulz (1990), who suggest that overinvestment in 
conglomerates is a potential source of the value loss from diversification. 
Panel C compares the sensitivity of the investments of business units and that of 
matched stand-alone firms. We use a specification drawn from Ozbas and Scharfstein (2010) 
and pool data for the business units and matched stand-alone firms. We then run regressions 
of investment on investment opportunities (imputed Tobin’s Q), cash flow, a dummy that 
equals one if an observation is from a unit of the conglomerate, and the interaction of the 
                                                 
13 To obtain this figure, we take the approach suggested by Berger and Ofek (1995) to compare our 
conglomerate and matched focused firms. For each of the five divisions, we collect data on all publicly-listed 
stand-alone firms doing business in the same three-digit SIC code. We then calculate the conglomerate’s excess 
value (EV) defined as EV=ln(MV/IV). MV, the firm’s market value, is defined as the market value of equity 
plus the book value of debt. IV, the firm’s hypothetical imputed value, is defined as the sum of the imputed 
hypothetical values of each division. The hypothetical division values are calculated as the division sales times 
the median value of the market value-to-sales ratio of a division’s matched publicly-listed stand-alone firms.  
14 Matched stand-alone firms are firms that operate in the same industries as the business units based on four-
digit NAICS codes. They are considered stand-alone if the first two (in robustness checks also the first three) 
digits of the first and secondary SIC codes are identical. We rely on SIC codes to identify focused firms as 
secondary NAICS codes are not available. The number of business units included in the analysis is less than 
twenty, as matched stand-alone firms are not available for all business units. 
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dummy and the first two variables. As Ozbas and Scharfstein (2010) find for divisions, we 
find that business units exhibit lower sensitivity of investment to Tobin’s Q, which suggests 
that their investment is generally less responsive to measures of investment opportunities 
than is that of stand-alone firms.15 
Taken together, the numbers in Table I suggest that the financial characteristics, the 
diversification discount, and the general investment behavior of our conglomerate are similar 
to those of other conglomerates. In the next section, we attempt to open the “black box” of 
the conglomerate’s capital allocation process for a better understanding of how resources are 
distributed and to identify potential sources of frictions in internal capital allocation.  
 
C. Internal Capital Allocation: Process and Data 
C.1 Internal Capital Allocation Process 
To better understand the mechanics of capital allocation we asked our firm to grant us 
access to internal company documents describing the internal budgeting, allocation, and 
execution processes and to provide us detailed data on planned and actual allocations. We 
were given access to information describing the details behind the budget creation and 
allocation processes of the firm, especially on (1) the elaboration of budgets; (2) the time 
lines of budgeting meetings; (3) the managers who participate in these meetings; and (4) the 
                                                 
15 We also carry out an analysis at division level following the method suggested by Shin and Stulz (1998), to 
further compare the conglomerate of our study with those of other studies that rely on divisional data. We 
thereby analyze the conglomerate’s internal capital market by regressing the investment of a division on its own 
cash flow, proxies for divisional investment opportunities, and the aggregate cash flow of the other divisions. 
We also use sales growth and imputed divisional Tobin’s Q as measures of investment opportunities. Our 
estimates are consistent with those documented for the average conglomerate in Shin and Stulz (1998). The 
estimates show that the firm operates an active internal capital market as a division’s investment is related to the 
cash flow available at other divisions. Moreover, the investment of a division depends much more on its own 
cash flow than on the cash flow of the firm’s other divisions, which suggests that the internal capital market 
does not fully insulate a division’s investment from its own operating cash flows. 
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procedures for approving investments. With these documents, and several interviews of 
managers—unit CEOs, controllers from headquarters, and unit controllers—involved in the 
budgeting process, we were able to put together the details of the full internal capital 
allocation process of the conglomerate.  
The general strategy of the firm is developed by the executive board and serves as the 
foundation for capital allocation and other major corporate decisions. The internal capital 
allocation process itself consists of two general stages: a budgeting (or planning) stage and a 
realization (or execution) stage. The steps of these two stages can be visualized in Figure 2 
and the exact details of the full process are described in Appendix A-3.  
[FIGURE 2 HERE] 
In the budgeting or planning stage (Panel A of Figure 2), the firm transforms the 
general corporate strategy into planned capital allocations (budgets). The transformation is 
completed in a two-phase process supported by the elaboration of two documents for each 
business unit: (1) the strategic outlook, and (2) the annual capital allocation plan.  
The goal of the first phase of budgeting is to develop a three-year strategic outlook for 
each business unit through discussions about the long-term strategy of the unit. In January of 
each year, business-unit CEOs begin identifying long-term growth and investment 
opportunities for their units. These business plans are then presented by the business-unit 
CEOs to the respective division CEOs. In February, negotiations take place over these 
opportunities; preliminary decisions on the business plans are made by the division CEOs in 
March. Each division CEO and his business-unit CEOs then present the three-year business 
plans of their units, using standardized forms, to the executive board and negotiate revisions 
and adjustments. The negotiations are coordinated, scheduled, and structured by corporate 
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control at headquarters, a centralized support service which also checks and analyzes the 
plans. In April, after negotiation with the executive board and the unit managers, the 
executive board makes a final decision on the figures in the strategic outlook. The strategic 
outlook includes general targets for planned investments and required resource allocations for 
all units. This document serves as the foundation for the internal capital allocation process. 
As described, the process is highly institutionalized and structured; decisions are made for the 
three-year period starting in January of the subsequent year.  
 The second phase of budgeting consists of the elaboration of a more detailed annual 
capital allocation plan for each business unit. This plan is a one-year investment plan 
containing detailed resource allocations. The annual plan of a unit is equivalent to a detailed 
breakdown of the capital allocation in the strategic outlook setting more concrete investment 
budgets.16 This plan also translates into a complete set of unit balance sheets and income 
statements, which are subsequently aggregated and consolidated at division and at firm level. 
Debate over the annual allocation plan gets underway in June; division CEOs draw on the 
strategic outlook to prepare investment and allocation targets for the coming year. In July, 
business-unit and division CEOs then negotiate these allocation plans and make any 
necessary adjustments. Preliminary budget decisions are made in August. As in the strategic 
outlook, again on standardized forms, the division and business-unit CEOs present the capital 
allocation plan to the executive board, and a second round of in-depth joint negotiations and 
revisions takes place in September and October. As in the strategic outlook, the negotiations 
                                                 
16 Appendix A-7 presents a time-line of the budgeting stage at our firm during the years of our analysis. The 
figure shows details of the calendar and overlap between the strategic outlook and the annual capital allocation 
phases of the budgeting stage. The figure also reports the years for which we have planned and actual 
accounting data available. 
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are coordinated, scheduled, and structured by corporate control. Finally, in October or 
November, the executive board decides on the investment budgets for the coming year. The 
divisions and business units then receive the approved plan and prepare the implementation 
for the coming year.  
It is during the realization or execution stage (Panel B of Figure 2) that concrete 
investments are made and the corresponding cash outflows are processed. Decisions here are 
made much more quickly than they are during budgeting. All investments (buying or 
replacing small machines or IT, for example) below a specific investment threshold can be 
made, quickly and easily, with simple procedures at the discretion of the business units. The 
thresholds depend on the divisions and on their capital intensity varying from 0.7 to 2.3 % of 
the mean total assets of the business units. Although the annual capital allocation plan is the 
basis for investments by the business units, the firm requires additional approvals for the 
execution of any project in the plan that involves investments in tangible or intangible fixed 
assets that exceed the investment threshold. If the proposed investment exceeds the threshold, 
the business unit must prepare, for approval by the division CEO and the executive board, an 
investment memo that contains (1) a document to be signed by the executive board, (2) a 
document describing the investment, and (3) a net present value calculation. The project 
description should explain the reason for and the risks of the investment and a discussion of 
alternatives. Each business unit must show that the investment will generate at least a positive 
NPV. For this reason, the company has constructed an NPV calculator, a spreadsheet 
provided by headquarters that all units must use to evaluate projects.17 Though important, the 
                                                 
17 As the discount rate for the NPV calculation, the firm uses a project-specific weighted average cost of capital 
(WACC), provided by headquarters. The input on interest rates, cost of debt, and country risk premiums used 
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NPV of a project is not the only relevant approval criterion. In fact, when it comes to deciding 
which positive NPV projects are to be carried out, other more loosely defined criteria, such as 
the strategic fit of a project, its cash-flow structure, or the past performance and reputation of 
the business-unit CEOs behind the project, also play an important role. Taking into account 
such a range of aspects to approve the execution of investments is not specific to our firm. 
The recent CEO survey by Graham, Harvey, and Puri (2010), confirms that actual allocation 
decisions in many firms are also based on cash-flow timing, market share, previous returns, 
and even on manager reputation, manager confidence, and gut feel. After taking into account 
all factors, the executive board makes a decision on the proposed investment and informs the 
business unit of its final decision by automated email. The business unit may then go forward 
with the investment by placing an order, signing a letter of intent or contract, or making a 
payment. Headquarters allocates the necessary funds.  
 
C.2 Internal Capital Allocation Data 
The process described above provides the basis for a better understanding of our 
capital allocation data. This data comes from the internal management accounting system and 
covers quarterly data on planned (i.e., budgeted) allocations and monthly data on actual (i.e., 
realized) capital allocations for each of the twenty business units from 01/2002 to 12/2006.  
Appendix A-7 reports the years for which we have planned and actual accounting data. Our 
data on planned allocations is taken from electronic files containing the annual capital 
allocation plans produced in the second phase of budgeting. Our data on realized allocations 
                                                                                                                                                        
for the calculation of the WACC is provided by the corporate treasury, at headquarters. Tax rates are provided 
by the corporate tax department, also at headquarters. 
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is taken from electronic files created by corporate control and is based on actual reporting by 
the business units. Once aggregated, this data is used by the firm to put together its external 
financial reporting.   
[TABLE II HERE] 
Panel A of Table II presents statistics for the data on planned allocations, whereas 
Panel B shows statistics for data on realized allocations. Both panels show averages for the 
business units in each of the five divisions. The exact definitions of all variables are 
presented in Appendix A-1; all variables are calculated on quarterly observations. Since we 
have twenty business units and twenty quarters, the maximum number of observations for 
planned data is four hundred unit-quarters. Although we lack some data for a few business 
units at the beginning of our sample period, the planned data on the main variables used in 
the paper, including capital expenditures, sales, EBIT, and total assets is available for at least 
359 business-unit-quarters. The coverage of data for planned R&D and marketing 
expenditures, cash flows from operations, and personnel is not as wide, since these variables 
were collected only as of 2004 and not at all for two business units. 
To compare data for planned and actual allocations, the table includes only 
observations that, for each variable, correspond to an exact match between the two forms of 
data.18 Differences between the values for planned and actual allocations are shown in Panel 
C. Values for planned allocations do not match those for realized allocations exactly; the 
comparisons permit three particular observations. First, sales are overestimated at all business 
units, and EBIT is overestimated for the units of three of the five divisions. Second, actual 
                                                 
18 Summary statistics across all unit-quarters for all available data are provided in Appendix A-4. Correlations 
are found in Appendix A-6. 
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sales growth and operational cash flows are not significantly different from planned values. 
Finally, and, for our analysis, most importantly, planned capital expenditures are statistically 
significantly higher than actual capital expenditures. This data suggests that business-unit 
managers across the firm use the standardized capital allocation process systematically to 
build slack into their budgets by over-budgeting for investments.19  
To illustrate the systematic over-budgeting of capital expenditures, Figure 3 plots 
annual averages of planned and actual capital expenditures for each of the twenty business 
units. The graph shows that the units end up over-budgeting and investing below their 
investment plans 83% of the time. The management accounting literature has called this 
pattern “budgetary slack,” not to be confused with financial slack. Our findings, the first to 
rely on hard data, corroborate those of previous research, which relies mostly on interviews 
or laboratory experiments to show that managers try to over-budget for their investments 
(Dunk and Nouri (1998), Onsi (1973), Merchant (1985), Dunk (1993), Young (1985), Chow, 
Cooper, and Waller (1988), Waller (1988), Stevens (2002), Davila and Wouters (2005)).  
[FIGURE 3 HERE] 
The documented pattern of over-budgeting is arguably costly, as it may keep funds 
available for all budgeted projects, which in turn may remain unused and be put into cash 
accounts earning returns below the cost of capital (Antle and Eppen (1985)). Moreover, it is 
problematic, as the budgeting process loses the “critical unbiased information that is required 
to coordinate the activities of disparate parts of an organization” (Jensen (2003, p. 379)). The 
                                                 
19 We find no statisitically significant connection between over-budgeting and the power and connections of the 
business-unit CEOs, suggesting that building this slack is a conglomerate-wide pattern. 
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next section presents evidence that helps us better understand the behavior and incentives of 
managers that may be behind this pattern of over-budgeting.  
 
II. The Effect of Managerial Power on Capital Allocations  
 The pronounced and consistent difference between planned and actual capital 
expenditures prompts questions about why unit CEOs would systematically ask for more 
capital than they actually invest. To understand this behavior, one must connect the internal 
capital allocation process and measures of managerial power. More specifically, we provide 
evidence in this section that managers use their overblown capital budgets to justify 
additional spending at times of financial slack. We show that more powerful and better 
connected business-unit CEOs obtain substantially higher actual capital allocations for their 
units when funds from cash windfalls are available.  
 
A. Measuring Power and Connections in the Firm  
There are forty-three business-unit CEOs working for the firm over the sample period. 
Only 45% percent of the managers are still employed by the firm; the rest have left or retired. 
Thirty-two of the managers worked as CEOs of only one business unit, nine as CEOs of two 
units, and two as CEOs of three units. So there is a total of fifty-six different manager-
business-unit pairs for the forty-three CEOs and twenty business units.  
To measure power and connections, we construct six indices capturing different 
dimensions of the strength and internal network of the forty-three different business-unit 
CEOs. Management profile data from BoardEx, ZoomInfo, social networking web pages 
(LinkedIn, Facebook, MySpace), annual reports, and systematic web and newspaper searches 
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are used in the construction of the first three indices. These indices are available for at least 
thirty-four of the forty-three unit managers. Despite a detailed search, the data for some 
components of the indices was not available for all managers. Table III presents averages of 
our six indices across unit managers, reported separately for each of the twenty business units 
and by division. Summary statistics for each of the variables used in the indices are also 
reported in Appendix A-2, and summary statistics for the indices across the full sample are 
reported in Appendix A-4. All variables and indices are standardized or constructed in such a 
way as to take values from zero to one.  
[TABLE III HERE] 
The first measure, Career at the Firm, proxies for a manager’s career at the firm and 
for his or her social network at the workplace. It draws on the management and sociology 
literature, which has underscored the importance of social networks at workplaces (Podolny 
and Baron (1997)). It is formed by averaging three variables, each normalized to fall between 
zero and one: (1) the number of months over which a manager coincided at a unit of the 
conglomerate with a person who later became an executive board member; (2) the number of 
years a manager has been working at the firm; and (3) the number of years a manager has 
been working in a powerful position at the firm (division CEO, business-unit CEO, or head of 
marketing). A measure of employment networks similar to the one we use for our first 
variable is used by Fracassi (2008). For the second and third variables, we assume as in Ryan 
and Wiggins (2004) or Berger, Ofek, and Yermack (1997) that the power and connections of 
managers increase as their tenures lengthen and that this effect is particularly pronounced if 
they are in powerful positions. We thereby attempt to capture the span of the more general 
social networks of managers inside the company.   
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The second index, CEO Similarity, assesses the similarity of a manager’s profile to 
that of the CEO of the firm (the firm had only one CEO during the sample period). It is 
formed by averaging the following four dummy variables: (1) a dummy equal to one if a 
manager speaks the native language of the CEO; (2) a dummy equal to one if a manager lives 
in the country in which the CEO lives; (3) a dummy equal to one if a manager went to the 
same university as the CEO; and (4) a dummy equal to one if a manager was a student in the 
same academic discipline as the CEO. The first two variables of the index are inspired by the 
work of Bandiera, Barankay, and Rasul (2009), who rely on workers’ and managers’ 
nationalities and the proximity of their dwelling places to assess the similarity of workers and 
managers. We assume that managers are more likely to be closer to the CEO if they speak the 
same language (which is not English) or live in close proximity to him (see Landier, Nair, 
and Wulf (2009) for similar measures). The latter matters as the firm is a multinational 
conglomerate with units around the world. The last two components measure personal 
connections via shared educational networks and academic backgrounds in an attempt to 
proxy, as in Cohen, Frazzini, and Malloy (2008), for the relationship of a manager and the 
CEO. The third index, Power Index, is formed by averaging the previous two indices.  
The three remaining indices are drawn from responses to a survey we took with the 
support of the firm. The survey contained both questions we wrote and questions previously 
used in the management and sociology literature (Podolny and Baron (1997), Forret and 
Dougherty (2001, 2004)). In the summer of 2008, after several beta tests, we distributed a 
questionnaire to all forty-three current and former business-unit CEOs. We guaranteed that 
the survey answers would be analyzed with full confidentiality and anonymity for research 
purposes only, and that they would not be traceable. In total, twenty business-unit CEOs—a 
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response rate of about 47%—returned the survey.20 The three survey-based indices are 
available for at least sixteen managers. The survey questions used to construct the indices and 
their summary statistics are reported in Appendix A-2 and summary statistics of the indices 
across the full sample are reported in Appendix A-4.  
Our Networker index measures the extent to which managers engage in networking 
within the firm. The survey questions used to construct the index are similar to those in Forret 
and Dougherty (2001, 2004). The index is formed by averaging the following five dummy 
variables: (1) a dummy equal to one if a manager is a member of a fraternity; (2) a dummy 
equal to one if a manager is a member of a social club inside the firm; (3) a dummy equal to 
one if a manager regularly stops by the headquarters to say “Hello”; (4) a dummy equal to 
one if a manager regularly accepts highly visible work assignments; and (5) a dummy equal 
to one if a manager participated regularly in highly visible task forces or committees.  
The fifth index, Division CEO Connection, measures how well a business-unit CEO is 
connected to his or her division CEO. The index is formed by averaging the following 
variables: (1) a dummy equal to one if a manager named the division CEO as a personal 
mentor; (2) a dummy equal to one if a manager lunches at least occasionally with the division 
CEO; and (3) a dummy equal to one if a manager meets the division CEO in person at least 
every two weeks. The survey question underlying item (1) is based on a question used in 
Podolny and Baron (1997), and the survey question underlying item (2) is based on a 
question used in Forret and Dougherty (2001, 2004). Finally, the last index presented in 
Table III is labeled Connected Networker and it is simply the result of averaging the previous 
                                                 
20As the firm supported our survey, we managed to get 65%—as opposed to only 22% of those who had left—of 
the unit CEOs who still worked at the firm to respond to our survey.  
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two indices. This index could be regarded as capturing an overall degree of the networking 
abilities of a manager. 
For all six indices Table III shows substantial variation both within and across 
divisions. Some units seem to score consistently higher than others when it comes to the 
power of their CEOs. It shows, for example, that the average values for the power and 
connection measures of business units in divisions 1 and 2 are generally below the average 
for the entire firm, whereas the values for those of divisions 4 and 5 are generally above it. 
This pattern, however, is not uniform across all units in a division, as some business units in 
divisions 1 and 2, for example, still score relatively high on some power measures. Moreover, 
the table shows that there is considerable variation across the six measures within a unit, 
indicating that they may be capturing complementary aspects of power and connection. 
[TABLE IV HERE] 
Panel A of Table IV provides an initial view of the role of managerial power and 
connections. It shows that power and connections help explain differences in investment rates 
and it serves as a point of departure for the more formal analysis in the next section of the 
paper. The panel is constructed as follows. For each of the six indices of power or 
connections, Panel A shows business units separated into two subsamples. First, for each year 
and business unit we calculate the average value of each index. Second, we calculate the 
median values across the business-unit-years and split the sample. For each measure of 
power, a business-unit-year is in the high-power group if the power measure is above the 
median of the sample and in the low-power group if it is below it. The panel shows average 
investment rates for business units in the two subsamples and indicates whether the 
difference in investment rates is statistically different from zero. For each subsample, we also 
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show the investment rates of matched stand-alone firms. Panel A provides evidence along 
two dimensions. First, it suggests that units run by more powerful or better connected 
managers invest significantly more than units run by less powerful or less well-connected 
managers. Second, it suggests that units run by high-power managers also invest at 
statistically significantly higher rates than matched stand-alone firms. By the criterion of the 
index of Career at the Firm, for example, a powerful unit has an annual investment rate of 
0.061, compared to only 0.033 for a unit with low power and compared to 0.400 of matched 
stand-alone firms.  
 
B. Managerial Power and Planned Capital Allocations 
To understand intra-firm capital allocation, the management accounting literature 
provides a different description and analysis of the budgeting (planning) and realization (or 
execution) stage for capital allocation (Hirst and Baxter (1993), Marshuetz (1985) Mukherjee 
(1988), Zaring (1996)). This literature also explains in depth how to design the budgeting 
stage to diminish the detrimental effects of managerial power and connections. Most authors 
agree that firms should try to set up a structured system of checks and balances to mitigate 
managerial influence activities.21 Our conglomerate designed its budgeting stage, as 
described in Section I, with characteristics resembling those suggested in the literature to 
limit managerial influence activities during the planning phase.  
                                                 
21 Piercy (1987), for example, lists the following organizational tools that provide management mechanisms 
with which to improve the budgeting process: a formal organizational structure, the control of flows of 
information, avoidance of social interaction between people involved in the budget setting (between controllers 
at headquarters and unit managers), and a rewards and sanctions system associated with budget outcomes. 
Maccarone (1996) provides related suggestions. Similarly, textbooks in both management accounting and 
finance provide detailed suggestions on how to structure the budgeting process to reduce the effects of influence 
activities and corporate politics in capital allocation (Anthony and Govindarajan (2007), Brealey, Myers, and 
Allen (2006)). 
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[TABLE V HERE] 
Table V presents regressions of ex ante planned investment on our measures of power 
and connections, and a set of measures of investment opportunities.22 We run these 
regressions to test more formally whether the mechanisms and structures used by our 
conglomerate in the budgeting process reduce the effect of managerial influence on capital 
allocation. The estimates show that planned investment is significantly related to measures of 
future growth opportunities and profitability, indicating that the budgeting process attempts 
to allocate funds to the units with the best prospects. These results are in line with 
neoclassical investment models that suggest that corporate resources should go to the units 
with the greatest growth opportunities (Maksimovic and Phillips (2002)). Interestingly, we 
are unable to detect a statistical relationship between our measures of power and ex ante 
capital allocations. These findings suggest that power and connections do not play a strong 
role in the normal capital budgeting stage (that is, for data for planned allocations). It is thus 
likely that the structured process described in Section I is able to neutralize managerial power 
in the budgeting or planning phase. 
Managerial power and connections may not affect planned allocations and the 
budgeting stage, but one wonders if power is important in the realization (or execution) stage. 
Although a structured budgeting phase may be designed to minimize the effects of corporate 
politics on planned capital budgets, actual capital allocations in the realization phase may still 
                                                 
22 Having access to planning data allows us to use the profitability measures actually used by the firm to assess 
future opportunities. We control for lagged values of planned EBIT divided by total assets, a measure of 
planned capital intensity, planned sales growth, and the lagged deviation of planned from actual EBIT. This 
regression setup is consistent with management accounting research in which, for example, budget adjustments 
as a result of spending variances are analyzed (Lee and Plummer (2007)). We include a fourth-quarter dummy, 
as some of the business units sell large fractions of their products in the fourth quarter. The regressions include 
lagged values of the power and connection indices, as power in the current period may affect budgets drawn up 
for the following period.   
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be distorted by power and connections. Appendix A-6 presents some evidence of the 
association between actual capital allocations and our power indices. The pair-wise 
correlations of our six power indices and actual allocations are between 0.28 and 0.41. We 
therefore need to take a closer look at the realization stage, a look that will also help us 
understand why managers have incentives to over-budget investments. 
 
C. Cash Windfalls and Capital Allocations 
Though it seems difficult to deviate much from planned allocations and, in particular, 
to exceed the plans, we argue and provide evidence that power may be particularly useful 
when large windfalls arise and ad hoc decisions need to be made. In other words, although 
the budgeting stage is formally structured to minimize the effects of power, the realization 
stage may allow managers to exercise influence after cash windfalls resulting allocation. 
The theoretical basis for this conjecture comes from the normative budgeting 
literature. Based on an extensive literature review, Sisaye (1995) predicts when and how 
power is most likely to matter. He writes that “when resources are scarce, the resource 
allocation decisions give priority to technical and economic considerations” (p. 133). Capital 
budgeting in firms is then based on a “rational choice model for resource allocation 
decisions” (p. 133) and the allocations follow a formalized organizational process. By 
contrast, he continues, “a political approach [is] commonly used in conflictual organizational 
settings in which units bargain or compromise to receive a larger proportion of slack 
organizational resources” (p. 151).23 Applied to our setting, Sisaye’s analysis suggests that 
                                                 
23 Slack resources, not be confused with budgetary slack, are resources in excess of those planned in the 
budgets. 
 27
resource allocation decisions after cash windfalls become a political process and may be 
affected by the power and connections of business-unit managers. Zaring (1996, p. 233) 
observes that “there is a lack of clarity about the way the models [used for capital budgeting] 
should incorporate environmental consequences—the unexpected as well as the expected,” an 
observation that suggests practices such as those in place at the firm we study are not out of 
the ordinary. 
In this section, we document empirically how managerial power and connections 
affect capital allocations for investment after exogenous cash windfalls. During the sample 
period, our conglomerate experienced eight large cash windfalls resulting from headquarters’ 
sales of equity stakes in other companies. The equity sales occurred in six different quarters. 
Calculated across these six quarters, the average cash inflow from the windfalls comes to 
€938 million. In all eight cases, the stakes were considered non-strategic holdings whose sale 
allowed the firm to cut its exposure to those industries and exploit market opportunities. As 
illustrated in Figure 4, the cash windfalls are substantial and are therefore likely to have an 
impact on the operations of the conglomerate. Depending on the year, for example, the 
windfalls represent between 24 and 84% of the firm’s total annual operational cash flow and 
between 160 and 403% of its total annual capital expenditures. Appendix A-5 provides more 
details of the windfalls.  
[FIGURE 4 HERE] 
The cash windfalls described provide a suitable scenario for testing the effects of 
power and connections on capital allocation for four main reasons. First, the impact of power 
on the distribution of windfalls rather than on planned capital budgets per se mitigates 
potential reverse causality problems; after all, historically high planned capital allocations 
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could themselves be a source of intra-organizational managerial power. Second, cash 
windfalls are largely exogenous to the divisions and their business units because the equity 
stakes are not part of the unit's assets,24 they are held and managed by headquarters, and the 
decision to sell them is made by corporate headquarters alone. Finally as Table I shows, our 
firm is neither financially constrained nor in need of cash to finance investment opportunities. 
The sale of the stakes is therefore not endogenous in the sense that they do not seem to be 
sold to finance essential investment. Panel B of Appendix A-5 further dispel any notion that 
the equity stakes are sold primarily to raise capital for the financing of projects. The panel 
shows that only 19% of the money from the windfalls is used by the conglomerate for 
internal investments. Twenty percent of the money is paid out to the firms’ shareholders in 
the form of dividends and share repurchases, and another 20% is used to increase cash 
holdings. 25  
 In Panel B of Table IV we provide a simple analysis linking the investment rates of 
business units and the allocation of funds from cash windfalls. We split business units into 
two subsamples based on the difference between capital expenditures in cash-windfall and 
no-cash-windfall quarters. If the difference is large, it suggests that the capital expenditures 
of the business unit increase greatly when proceeds from cash windfalls are available; if it is 
small it suggests that they increase only little. A business unit belongs to the high-allocation 
                                                 
24 The lines of businesses of the companies in which the equity stakes are sold are unrelated to those of the 
business units of the conglomerate in five of the eight cases. In the remaining three cases, the only relationship 
to the business of the units is that the equity stakes sold belong to firms which were suppliers to two of the 
conglomerate’s units. Our results are robust to the exclusion of these two units from our analysis. 
25 A related question is why the conglomerate's shareholders do not demand full payout of the cash windfalls.  
Part of the explanation may be the standard free cash-flow argument of Jensen (1986). Apart from having 
relatively low leverage, the firm is widely held and does not have block-holders owning above 5% of the shares. 
Additionally, the conglomerate operates in a country that, according to the investor protection indices by La 
Porta et al. (1998) and Djankov et al. (2008), is considered to have rather weak anti-director and anti-self-
dealing rights.  
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subsample if the difference in allocation between cash-windfall and no-cash-windfall quarters 
is above the median and it belongs to the low-allocation subsample if the difference is below 
the median. Panel B shows that units where the difference in allocation from cash-windfall to 
non-cash-windfall quarters is large have investment rates almost twice as high as those of 
units that receive little from the windfalls; the investment rates are also substantially higher 
than those of matched stand-alone firms. This simple analysis suggests that investment rates 
may be connected to the distribution of cash windfalls. 
 
D. Allocation of Cash Windfalls and Managerial Power 
 Figure 5 shows that cash windfalls seem to be associated with changes to actual unit 
investment. Although actual investment is generally less than planned investment, actual 
capital expenditure is substantially closer to the planned budgets during cash-windfall 
quarters. This effect is statistically significant at the 1% level and uniform across all cash-
windfall quarters. If managerial power matters for the allocation of cash windfalls, more 
powerful or better connected managers should receive a larger share of the windfalls. In other 
words, the investments ultimately made by their units exceed planned investments by more 
than the investments ultimately made by units run by managers who, as it were, are less likely 
to spend an afternoon on the links with executive managers from headquarters or to wax 
nostalgic with the CEO of the conglomerate for their long-gone days at the old alma mater.  
[FIGURE 5 HERE] 
 To investigate this hypothesis formally, the regressions reported in Table VI use the 
difference of actual minus planned capital expenditures over total assets as the dependent 
variable. This measure is similar to the one in Rajan, Servaes and Zingales (2000) but instead 
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of using industry average expenditures, our analysis exploits the availability of business-unit 
planned investment data. If planned allocations already reflect the investment opportunities of 
the business units, our analysis has the advantage that it partially accounts for differences in 
investment opportunities across units. All regressions in Table VI also account for 
unobserved business-unit heterogeneity and year fixed effects. Regressions include a fourth-
quarter dummy, as some of the business units sell substantial fractions of their products 
towards the end of the year.  
[TABLE VI HERE] 
 The first three specifications in Table VI analyze the impact of of cash windfalls and 
proxies of investment opportunities before introducing our measures of managerial power. 
Consistent with the pattern presented in Figure 5, the regression estimates in column 1a show 
that the cash windfalls move actual investments close to those planned.  
The estimates in column 1b show that investment opportunities, as proxied by sales 
growth and EBIT over assets, have a significant positive impact on how close to each other 
actual and planned investments are. In particular, units with better opportunities are able to 
make more of the investments budgeted for, whereas those with fewer opportunities seem not 
to make as many budgeted investments. A one-standard-deviation increase in sales growth, 
for example, implies an increase of 0.0015 (i.e., 15%)  of  actual minus planned capital 
expenditures over assets. This change is equivalent to a 13% increase of the standard 
deviation of our dependent variable. These results are in line with neoclassical investment 
models (Maksimovic and Phillips (2002)), which suggest that corporate resources should go 
to the units with the highest growth opportunities and that units with better opportunities 
should therefore be closer to their plans. Specification 1b also shows that past deviations of 
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EBIT from its plan are also a significant determinant of the proximity of actual and planned 
investments: business units that were farther away from their EBIT plans in the past are less 
able to spend their entire investment budgets. This finding is consistent with the evidence in 
the accounting literature, which suggests that the so-called profitability planning variances, 
that is, differences between actual and planned EBIT, affect next-period actual capital 
allocations (Anthony and Govindarajan (2007), Balakrishnan, Sivaramakrishnan, and 
Sprinkle (2009)).  
Specification 1c includes both the cash-windfall variable and investment opportunities 
proxies. Estimates show that although the impact of sales growth weakens, while the 
significance of EBIT and its past deviations from plan remain strong. Controlling for 
investment opportunities reduces the statistical significance of cash windfalls to 10 percent, 
but its magnitude remains virtually intact. A cash windfall of €938 million, which equals the 
average cash windfall in a cash-windfall quarter, increases the difference of actual minus 
planned investment over assets by 0.0041. Holding fixed planned investment, this estimate 
suggests that actual investment increases by about this number.26 Relative to an average 
quarterly business-unit investment rate of 0.01, calculated across all no-cash-windfall 
quarters, our calculation says that the windfall leads to a substantial 41% increase in 
investment (see Table VI Panel B).  
 The increase in capital expenditures in cash-windfall quarters is far from homogenous 
from unit to unit; and some of the heterogeneity can be explained by different degrees of 
power and connections of business-unit managers. Columns two to seven of Table VI include 
                                                 
26 We can assume a fixed planned investment rate as the cash windfalls were not incorporated in the annual 
capital allocation plan.  
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the cash-windfall variable, our power or connection indices, and interactions of the two. The 
indices vary from regression to regression and are named in the columns above each 
regression. The estimates show that, controlling for investment opportunities and business-
unit heterogeneity, managerial power and connections have a significant impact on the 
allocation of cash windfalls. For all six indices we find that units run by more powerful or 
well-connected managers receive a substantially larger share of the windfalls, as indicated by 
the positive and significant coefficient of the interaction terms. Figure 6 complements this 
evidence providing a set of partial scatter plots based on the regression results of Table VI. 
These plots show that our results are not driven by outliers. 
[FIGURE 6 HERE] 
The estimated economic effects of power and connections on the cash-windfall 
distribution are large. Suppose the firm experiments a windfall of €938 million in a quarter. 
How do different degrees of managerial power or connection affect the difference between 
actual and planned investments? To illustrate these economic effects, Panel B of Table VI 
reports the changes in investment using the estimated coefficients of the regressions. Using, 
for example, Career at the Firm, we find that the investment rate of a unit run by a CEO with 
a power index at the twenty-fifth percentile of the distribution increases investment by only 
0.0002 after a windfall. This change corresponds to an increase of 2% relative to the average 
non-cash-windfall quarterly investment rate of 0.01. If, by contrast, a unit is run by a 
powerful CEO with a power index at the seventy-fifth percentile, investment increases by 
0.0039, which corresponds to a substantial 39% increase relative to the average non-cash-
windfall quarterly investment rate. The economic effects are similar and sometimes even 
larger for the other five indices. These effects are also displayed in Figure 7. Across all 
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indices, more powerful and better connected unit managers increase their actual investments 
on average 40% more than their peers do. 
[FIGURE 7 HERE] 
The estimates in Table VI provide strong evidence that well-connected and powerful 
managers can capture substantial amounts from cash windfalls. For a better understanding of 
why investments increase so substantially during cash-windfall quarters, we held several 
structured interviews with managers and other important decision makers at the 
conglomerate. One view expressed by our interviewees was that investment approval 
procedures in the realization stage seem to be more lax in periods of large cash windfalls. 
Some managers argued that the firm is thereby trying to avoid keeping large amounts of cash 
from accumulating in its cash accounts, which could cause it to become a target for 
shareholder activists. Our interlocutors also stated that the unspent money from regular 
planned capital allocations is not available for expenditure by other business units. Proceeds 
from cash windfalls, by contrast, are available to all units. If a unit does not use the available 
funds for its investments, they are likely to be used by others.  
Our results are consistent with these views. All managers have an incentive to over-
budget for their investments and to grab as large a share as possible of any windfalls. The 
expectation of financial slack helps explain why managers have incentives to over-budget for 
their investments: over-budgeting allows them to increase investments once cash windfalls 
arise, usually without going over budget. The variety of investment criteria considered during 
the execution stage provides flexibility and translates in a seemingly less stringent approval 
 34
process in the presence of cash windfalls. Importantly, our findings show that units run by 
powerful managers succeed in obtaining more investment approvals during windfalls.27 
 
III. Robustness and Alternative Explanations 
A. Alternative Regression Specifications and Controls 
In Table VII, we run a set of robustness checks of our main results. The table shows 
only the coefficient and standard error of the power-windfall interaction term (Managerial 
Power * Ln(1+Cash Windfall)). Specification A shows results using the same specification as 
in Table VI but without control variables to ensure that the impact of our power measures is 
not simply due to the specification used before. The following two specifications in Table VII 
consider alternative controls to those used in Table VI for investment opportunities and the 
importance of the unit in the firm, respectively. We exploit the availability of planned 
investment data to account for the unit profitability expected by the firm. Specification B, for 
example, uses planned sales growth as a proxy to control for the expected profitability of a 
unit. The results are similar if we use planned EBIT over assets (not shown) instead. Results 
are also robust to including cash flow from operations over assets and lagged values of EBIT 
over assets. In specification C, we control for the (strategic) importance of a unit using its 
size (total assets) as a proxy. Managerial power results are also robust to including other 
measures of importance such as the size of unit sales or cash flows. 
[TABLE VII HERE] 
                                                 
27 Since the conglomerate is headquartered in Europe, our results complement those in Graham, Harvey, and 
Puri (2010, p. 1), who find that corporate politics is more important for capital allocation in firms headquartered 
outside the United States.  
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The next three rows of the table present alternative econometric specifications to 
those used in Table VI. Specification D reports results from pooled OLS regressions, without 
business-unit fixed effects, but with standard errors clustered at business-unit level. 
Specification E is estimated as in D but without clustering of standard errors to ensure that 
our results are not affected by the relatively small number of clusters we use. In specification 
F, we estimate an AR(1) process for the error term as capital expenditures are often very 
persistent over time (Gatchev, Pulvino, and Tarhan (2010)) and to account for any possible 
autocorrelation in the error term that may arise from the use of lagged control variables.  
In the last two rows of the table, we address potential concerns about the design of our 
analysis. Specification G uses actual capital expenditures over total assets as the dependent 
variable. This specification suggest that units run by more powerful or connected managers 
get higher capital allocations from the cash windfalls irrespective of their planned budgets. 
Finally, specification H addresses the potential concern that three of the eight cash windfalls 
may not be entirely unrelated to the lines of business of the units. In these three cases, the 
windfalls result from the sale of equity stakes in firms that acted as suppliers to two of the 
business units (see Appendix A-5). In specification H, we take a radical approach and 
exclude all quarterly observations of these two business units. The estimates in Table VII 
show that our results are robust to these alternative specifications.  
 
B. Power as a Measure of Ability 
We also run a series of tests to mitigate concerns that managerial power and 
connection measures proxy for ability. We provide three pieces of evidence against this view. 
First, if power and connection capture ability, our measures of power should have an effect 
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on planned capital budgets such that more able managers get larger allocations ex ante. The 
findings in Table V show that managerial power is not connected to planned budgets.  
Second, if the power variables capture ability, our proxies should be positively related 
to the operating performance of the business units. To examine whether such a positive 
relation exists, we regress the operating performance on our power proxies and a set of 
controls in Table VIII. We take sales growth as a measure of operating performance.28 We 
control for cash flow from operations, past investment, marketing expenditures, R&D 
expenditures, total sales, and personnel intensity (number of employees relative to assets). 
The estimates reported in Table VIII show that we cannot detect a positive and statistically 
significant relation between performance and our measures of managerial power and 
connections.  
[TABLE VIII HERE] 
Finally, we attempt to develop direct proxies for managers’ ability. One can argue that 
more able managers are more likely to hold a degree from a top university and that higher 
ability managers are more highly visible and more likely to be hired as non-executives by 
other companies. To test for these two possibilities, we collect additional information on 
whether unit CEOs hold a degree from an elite university and whether they hold non-
executive directorships outside the firm. Appendix A-1 provides the definition and method to 
construct these two proxies. Summary statistics for the ability proxies are also reported in 
Appendix A-4. 
                                                 
28 Our results are similar if we use EBIT/Total Assets as a proxy for performance. The advantage of using sales 
growth as the performance measure is that this variable is more easily verified and less prone to potential 
window dressing by the unit managers. 
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Although these two variables are certainly not perfect proxies, it is not unreasonable 
to assume that they are correlated with ability. Some supporting evidence for this argument 
comes from Appendix A-8, which shows that the two ability proxies are related to measures 
of business-unit performance (i.e., sales growth) and planned capital allocation. These 
estimates provide evidence that units run by more able managers perform better and receive 
larger budget allocations  
In Table IX, we add each of these two ability proxies as well as interaction terms 
between the proxies and cash windfalls to the specifications presented in Table VI. Panel A 
shows results when we use the elite-university variable and Panel B when we use the non-
executive-director variable. The estimates show that our results are robust to direct inclusions 
of proxies for ability; some power variables even become more significant.  
[TABLE IX HERE] 
 
C. Endogenous Allocation of Managers to Business Units 
Another alternative explanation for our findings may be the endogenous allocation of 
powerful and well-connected managers to those business units with the best investment 
opportunities. There are two main versions of this view. The first version, related to the 
interpretation of power as ability, holds that headquarters allocates the most able managers to 
the business units with the brightest prospects. In this scenario, ability drives the allocation of 
managers.  The second version argues that the most powerful managers lobby to be placed at 
the units with the best investment prospects. In this scenario, the allocation of managers to 
units is driven by their power rather than by their ability to run a specific unit.  
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Though plausible, our data suggests that neither of these two versions is likely to 
explain our results. First, the evidence already presented in Tables V and VIII does not square 
with either of these two versions. There does not seem to be a positive relationship between 
(i) the power variables and planned capital budgets and between (ii) the power variables and 
future performance. Second, the correlations presented in Appendix A-6 show that there is no 
significant relationship between our indices of managerial power and actual sales, sales 
growth, and EBIT/Assets. If anything, there seems to be a negative correlation between 
managerial power and Tobin's Q. Finally, the internal job movements are rather rare in our 
firm and the connections and power of managers who moved from one unit to another are not 
significantly different from those of the rest of the managers. Of all forty-three business-unit 
CEOs employed over the sample period, only eleven moved from one business unit to 
running another. If we compare the indices of power and connection of the eleven managers 
who moved from one unit to another and those of the managers who did not move, we detect 
no significant between-group differences.  
 
D. Capital Expenditures versus Marketing and R&D Expenditures 
 Our analysis has focused on the effects of power and connections on the allocation of 
windfalls for capital expenditures. Our focus follows that of the previous literature as capital 
expenditures are typically associated with empire-building by CEOs and unit managers 
(Jensen (1986), Shleifer and Vishny (1989), Scharfstein and Stein (2000)). They are visible 
investments, associated with status and prestige.  
 So far, we have not looked into allocations for research and development (R&D) or 
marketing expenditures. The nature of R&D and marketing expenditures is different from 
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that of capital expenditures. R&D investments are usually riskier than capital expenditures 
and are subject to large uncertainty. Moreover, there is usually a great lag between the 
initiation of an R&D project and the point at which it begins to bear fruit. This lag may also 
account in part for managers’ failure to invest more heavily in R&D (Hirshleifer and Thakor 
(1992)). Marketing expenditures are also different from capital expenditures, additional 
marketing may have positive externalities on other units of the firm, whereas the effects of 
additional capital expenditures are felt mostly at the unit making the expenditures. For all of 
these reasons, bargaining-power theories usually model capital expenditures to analyze the 
relationship between power or connections and capital allocations (Scharfstein and Stein 
(2000)).   
 We do not expect R&D and marketing expenditures to change significantly after the 
arrival of windfalls. Evidence consistent with these expectations is provided in Appendix A-
9, which shows the cash-windfall regressions of Table VI with R&D (Panel A) and marketing 
expenditures (Panel B) instead of capital expenditures. These two dependent variables are 
also constructed as the difference between actual and planned expenditures over assets.  The 
estimates in column 1 of Panels A and B show that cash windfalls do not seem to affect the 
deviation of actual from planned R&D and marketing expenditures. This lack of significance 
is consistent with evidence suggesting that firms smooth R&D expenditures over time and 
that shocks to cash flows do not seem to affect R&D expenditures (Lach and Schankerman 
(1989), Hall (2002)). Moreover, R&D expenditures are usually conducted based on long-term 
plans and often constitute a fixed fraction of sales (Anthony and Govindarajan (2007)). 
Furthermore, R&D expenditures are very difficult to adjust as they mainly represent labor 
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expenses for scientists and engineers who are difficult to hire on short notice (Lach and 
Schankerman (1989)). Similar arguments apply for marketing expenditures.  
 For all the reasons alluded above, we also do not expect power and connections 
themselves to have an effect on the distribution of the cash windfalls for R&D or marketing 
expenditures. Columns two to seven of both Panels of Appendix A-9 show evidence 
consistent with this expectation. Two additional structural features present in many 
conglomerates may also help explain the lack of impact of windfalls and managerial power 
on R&D and marketing expenses. First, research activities are often shared by business units 
in research-competence centers, so R&D expenditures, too, are less likely to be determined 
by individual unit managers than are capital expenditures. Second, a large part of marketing 
expenditures focus on promoting the brand name of the firm. So marketing expenses are 
much less at the discretion of managers within the firm and less exposed to internal power 
struggles. 
 
IV. Conclusion 
Our analysis tries to open up the black box of internal capital markets and test 
predictions of theories linking managerial power and connections to capital allocations. To 
test these predictions, we combine a unique dataset from the internal management accounting 
system of a large international conglomerate, information on the backgrounds of 
management, and internal survey data. We provide some of the first empirical evidence 
showing that although all managers use the standardized budgeting process to build buffers 
into their budgets, units run by more powerful and better connected managers are able to 
obtain substantially higher capital allocations at times of firm financial slack.  
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Our empirical findings provide hard evidence that managerial power and connections 
may be a major source of frictions in internal capital allocation. In its attempts to understand 
the most important factors affecting the internal distribution of capital across corporate 
divisions, our paper complements the recent CEO survey by Graham, Harvey, and Puri 
(2010), and a large descriptive literature on the ways in which political activity, lobbying, and 
persuasion affect capital budgeting (Pfeffer and Salancik (1974), Covaleski and Dirsmith 
(1986), Hirst and Baxter (1993)). 
Our findings open up an interesting new area for future research, since regular capital 
allocation by which budgets are planned seems not to be significantly distorted by power. It 
is possible that normal capital allocation already includes checks and balances whose aim is 
to reduce managerial influence activities. In fact, our conglomerates’ capital allocation 
process includes sophisticated and institutionalized procedures for the setting of ex-ante 
planned allocations closely resembling those of textbook recommendations (Brealey, Myers, 
and Allen (2006), Anthony and Govindarajan (2003)). In contrast, our results show that 
bargaining power is highly relevant for ad hoc distribution of surprise windfalls. It is thus in 
the wake of such windfalls, less likely to be incorporated into the firm’s institutionalized and 
structured processes for allocating capital, that managerial power may be wielded to greatest 
effect.  
The results presented here have several implications. Most narrowly, and from a 
firm’s perspective, they may justify policies of automatic job rotation, as described in Stein 
(2003) for General Electric. Such policies usually mean that managers are automatically 
moved from one division to another, thereby reducing their incentives to bargain for large 
 42
capital allocations for their current units. Another implication for managerial practice is to 
formulate rules on how to proceed when unexpected cash windfalls arise.  
More generally, our findings also have implications for the area of organizational 
economics, and our understanding of the circumstances under which individuals may choose 
to exercise power. They may contribute, for example, to an understanding of the effects of 
lobbying faculty deans at universities when large donations are received, the success of 
politically well-connected firms to obtain government funds when countries get IMF or 
World Bank assistance (e.g., Faccio, Masulis, and McConnell (2006)), or the effects of 
political power of interest groups or individuals on government spending during times of 
unexpectedly high tax revenues.   
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 Table I  
Financial Characteristics of the Conglomerate and Investment of Its Business Units 
 
Panel A of this table shows the main financial ratios of the conglomerate and compares these ratios with those of non-financial 
conglomerates in the Euro Stoxx 50 and the Dow Jones 30 indices. Conglomerates are all firms from the indices with at least two 
divisions (segments) in different 2SIC codes. The reported ratios are the averages of annual data over the period 2002 to 2006. We 
also report the median, standard deviation, and the 25th and 75th percentiles for the conglomerates in each of the indices. Panel B 
presents statistics for annual investment rates (capital expenditures/total assets) of the conglomerate’s business units and of matched 
stand-alone firms over the period. Matched stand-alone firms are the firms included in Compustat (Global and North America) that, 
based on four-digit NAICS codes, operate in the same industries as the business units. Matched stand-alone firms are considered 
focused if the first two (2SIC) digits of the primary and secondary SIC codes are identical (results are very similar if we require that 
the first three (3SIC) digits are identical, but we have less matches). We rely on SIC codes to identify stand-alone firms as secondary 
NAICS codes are not available. The number of business units included in the analyses of Panel B is less than the twenty business units 
of the conglomerate (and the number of annual observations is thus less than one hundred), as matched stand-alone firms could not be 
identified for all years for three of the twenty business units. The last column of the panel presents the p-value of a difference-in-
means t-test comparing the investment rates of the business units of our conglomerate and those of the matched stand-alone firms. 
Panel C follows Ozbas and Scharfstein (2010) and presents OLS regressions to analyze the sensitivity of investment rates of the 
business units of the conglomerate and those of matched stand-alone  firms. Robust standard errors, clustered at firm level, are shown 
in parentheses. All variables in Panel C are Winsorized at 1%. Detailed definitions of each variable in the table are provided in 
Appendix A-1. *** indicates significance at 1%, ** indicates significance at 5%, and * indicates significance at 10%. 
    
Panel A: Comparison of Financial Ratios of Our Conglomerate and of Other Conglomerates 
    
 Conglomerate  Euro Stoxx 50 Conglomerates [N=32] 
      Mean Median Std. dev. 25% 75% 
Capital Expenditures/Total assets 0.032  0.086 0.074 0.068 0.047 0.121 
Total Debt/Total Assets 0.478  0.643 0.648 0.125 0.581 0.724 
Cash Holdings/Total Assets 0.141  0.105 0.068 0.098 0.047 0.113 
Dividends/EBIT 0.474   0.255 0.241 0.313 0.179 0.302 
    
    
 Conglomerate  Dow Jones 30 Conglomerates [N=28] 
      Mean Median Std. dev. 25% 75% 
Capital Expenditures/Total Assets 0.032  0.042 0.038 0.023 0.023 0.051 
Total Debt/Total Assets 0.478  0.583 0.547 0.171 0.487 0.687 
Cash Holdings/Total Assets 0.141  0.108 0.073 0.124 0.032 0.132 
Dividends/EBIT 0.474   0.276 0.250 0.260 0.150 0.329 
 
Panel B: Investment Rates of Business Units and Matched Stand-alone  Firms 
 Capital Expenditures/Total Assets 
 Obs. Mean Median Std. dev p-value 
Business Units of the Conglomerate 88 0.046 0.031 0.040 
Matched Stand-alone  Firms  305 0.036 0.027 0.037 
0.0171** 
 
Panel C: Investment Sensitivity of Business Units and Matched Stand-alone  Firms 
 Capital Expenditures/Total Assets  
 [1] [2] [3] [4] 
  [2SIC] [3SIC] [2SIC] [3SIC] 
     
Imputed Tobin’s Q * Business Unit  -0.0202** -0.0203** -0.0178* -0.0179* 
 [0.0101] [0.0102] [0.0101] [0.0102] 
Imputed Tobin’s Q 0.0039 0.0040 0.0041 0.0042 
 [0.0025] [0.0026] [0.0026] [0.0027] 
Cash Flow from Operations/Total Assets * Business Unit  -0.1036** -0.1038** -0.1029** -0.1050** 
 [0.0502] [0.0510] [0.0509] [0.0517] 
Cash Flow from Operations/Total Assets 0.0232 0.0233 0.0234 0.0236 
 [0.0220] [0.0231] [0.0222] [0.0233] 
Constant 0.0325*** 0.0378*** 0.0341*** 0.0386*** 
 [0.0075] [0.0086] [0.0073] [0.0084] 
     
Firm/Business-Unit Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes 
     
Observations 352 260 352 260 
Number of Firms & Business Units 80 66 80 66 
Adjusted R-squared 0.145 0.155 0.141 0.150 
 
Table II  
Business-Unit Planned and Actual Accounting Data 
 
This table shows the planned (i.e., budgeted) and actual (i.e., realized) accounting data for the business units of the conglomerate. The 
data is obtained from the internal management accounting system of the conglomerate. The numbers reported in each column 
correspond to the means of all business units within each division between 01/2002 and 12/2006. Panel A reports planned accounting 
data, whereas Panel B reports actual accounting data. To ensure comparability, Panels A and B contain only the information of 
business units that have both planned and actual data. The number of observations for each variable and each division is reported in 
brackets underneath the respective value. Panel C reports the difference between planned and actual data and the significance levels of 
difference-in-means t-tests between planned and actual data. Detailed definitions of each variable are provided in Appendix A-1. *** 
indicates significance at 1%, ** indicates significance at 5%, and * indicates significance at 10%. 
      
Panel A: Plan Data  Division 1 Division 2 Division 3 Division 4 Division 5 
Planned Sales (millions) 795.84 218.21 1300.10 325.79 149.96 
 [60] [160] [19] [80] [72] 
Planned EBIT/Total Assets 0.010 0.027 0.018 0.066 0.090 
 [60] [160] [19] [80] [72] 
Planned Sales Growth 0.091 0.054 0.023 0.014 0.097 
 [57] [152] [18] [76] [68] 
Planned Cash Flow from Operations/Total Assets 0.012 0.036 0.066 0.073 0.128 
 [36] [96] [11] [48] [24] 
Planned Capital Expenditures  (millions) 7.74 4.48 112.55 13.86 6.25 
 [36] [160] [19] [80] [64] 
Planned Capital Expenditures/Total Assets 0.011 0.008 0.029 0.021 0.027 
 [36] [160] [19] [80] [64] 
Planned R&D Expenditures/Total Assets 0.077 0.033 0.064 0.024 0.034 
 [36] [92] [11] [48] [24] 
Planned Marketing Expenditures/Total Assets 0.193 0.064 0.021 0.092 0.163 
 [36] [96] [11] [48] [24] 
Planned Personnel (# of employees) 4479 3810 33382 10554 2368 
 [36] [96] [11] [48] [24] 
      
Panel B: Actual Data Division 1 Division 2 Division 3 Division 4 Division 5 
Sales (millions) 754.87 206.07 1132.43 314.39 138.39 
 [60] [160] [19] [80] [72] 
EBIT/Total Assets -0.020 0.014 0.006 0.061 0.089 
 [60] [160] [19] [80] [72] 
Sales Growth 0.042 0.056 -0.006 0.014 0.095 
 [57] [152] [18] [76] [68] 
Cash Flow from Operations/Total Assets -0.040 0.031 0.072 0.072 0.129 
 [36] [96] [11] [48] [24] 
Capital Expenditures (millions) 4.94 3.25 90.95 10.62 4.72 
 [36] [160] [19] [80] [64] 
Capital Expenditures/Total Assets 0.006 0.005 0.023 0.015 0.019 
 [36] [160] [19] [80] [64] 
R&D Expenditures/Total Assets 0.060 0.030 0.062 0.024 0.032 
 [36] [92] [11] [48] [24] 
Marketing Expenditures/Total Assets 0.156 0.062 0.021 0.092 0.150 
 [36] [96] [11] [48] [24] 
Personnel  (# of employees)  4631 3709 34804 10745 2366 
 [36] [96] [11] [48] [24] 
      
Panel C: Differences (Actual– Plan) Division 1 Division 2 Division 3 Division 4 Division 5 
Sales (millions) (Actual-Plan) -40.97*** -12.15*** -167.66*** -11.40*** -11.57*** 
 [60] [160] [19] [80] [72] 
EBIT/Total Assets (Actual-Plan) -0.030** -0.012 -0.012* -0.005* -0.001 
 [60] [160] [19] [80] [72] 
Sales Growth (Actual-Plan) -0.050 0.002 -0.028 -0.001 -0.002 
 [57] [152] [18] [76] [68] 
Cash Flow from Operations/Total Assets (Actual-Plan) -0.052 -0.005 0.006 -0.001 0.001 
 [36] [96] [11] [48] [24] 
Capital Expenditures (millions) (Actual-Plan) -2.80*** -1.23*** -21.60* -3.23*** -1.53*** 
 [36] [160] [19] [80] [64] 
Capital Expenditures/Total Assets (Actual-Plan) -0.005*** -0.003*** -0.005* -0.006*** -0.008*** 
 [36] [160] [19] [80] [64] 
R&D Expenditures/Total Assets (Actual-Plan) -0.017** -0.003*** -0.002 0.000 -0.002** 
 [36] [92] [11] [48] [24] 
Marketing Expenditures/Total Assets (Actual-Plan) -0.037** -0.003*** 0.000 0.000 -0.013** 
 [36] [96] [11] [48] [24] 
Personnel  (# of employees) (Actual-Plan)  -152 101 -1422 -191 2 
 [36] [96] [11] [48] [24] 
 
 
Table III 
Indices of Managerial Power and Connections 
          
This table presents the indices of managerial power and connections for the business-unit CEOs of the conglomerate.  The second and 
third columns of the table show the number of business units and the number of business-unit CEOs in each of the division of the 
conglomerate. There are twenty business units in the five divisions of the conglomerate. The total number of individual business-unit 
CEOs employed during our sample period is forty-three. The last six columns of the table report the mean values of the six indices of 
managerial power and connections for the managers in each business unit and each division of the conglomerate across the sample 
period from 01/2002 to 12/2006. Empty cells are missing data. The reports also in italics the p-values of Kruskal-Wallis tests, which 
test whether the indices are statistically different across business units within a division and across the business units of all divisions. 
Detailed definitions of each variable are provided in Appendix A-1. 
 
      Managerial Power Indices 
Division  Business Unit  
Number of 
business-unit 
CEOs 
Career at the 
Firm 
CEO 
Similarity Power Index Networker 
Division CEO 
Connection 
Connected 
Networker 
1 1 1 0.497 0.500 0.498    
1 2 2 0.264 0.250 0.257 0.200 0.333 0.267 
1 3 5 0.144 0.413 0.278 0.200 0.333 0.267 
Mean of Division 1  0.316 0.302 0.388 0.345 0.200 0.333 
p-value (Kruskal-Wallis test) 
   
0.0001 
 
0.0001 
 
0.0001 
 
0.0001 
 
0.0001 
 
0.0001 
 
2 1 3 0.318 0.594 0.456 1.000   
2 2 5 0.292 0.708 0.500 0.433 0.250 0.200 
2 3 2 0.081 0.250 0.165 0.400 0.667 0.533 
2 4 4 0.116 0.125 0.120 0.400 0.333 0.367 
2 5 2 0.045 0.438 0.241 0.450 0.333 0.392 
2 6 4 0.095 0.344 0.220 0.500 0.583 0.542 
2 7 2 0.108 0.463 0.285    
2 8 2 0.103 0.500 0.318       
Mean of Division 2  0.152 0.145 0.428 0.288 0.531 0.433 
p-value (Kruskal-Wallis test) 
   
0.0001 
 
0.0001 
 
0.0001 
 
0.0001 
 
0.0001 
 
0.0001 
 
3 1 3 0.265 0.500 0.382       
Mean of  Division 3  0.277 0.277 0.277 0.265 0.500 0.382 
p-value (Kruskal-Wallis test) 
   
n/a 
 
n/a 
 
n/a 
 
n/a 
 
n/a 
 
n/a 
 
4 1 3 0.640 0.800 0.720 0.429 0.714 0.571 
4 2 2 0.213 0.750 0.482    
4 3 2 0.892 0.575 0.946 0.570 0.950 0.760 
4 4 4 0.280 0.563 0.421 0.378 0.444 0.411 
Mean of Division 4  0.530 0.506 0.672 0.642 0.459 0.703 
p-value (Kruskal-Wallis test) 
   
0.0005 
 
0.0005 
 
0.0005 
 
0.0005 
 
0.0077 
 
0.0005 
 
5 1 2 0.569 0.500 0.535 0.600 0.667 0.633 
5 2 2 0.738 0.500 0.619    
5 3 3 0.357 0.463 0.410 0.600 0.765 0.682 
5 4 3 0.051 0.488 0.269 0.442 0.474 0.458 
Mean of Division 5  0.449 0.429 0.488 0.458 0.547 0.635 
p-value (Kruskal-Wallis test) 
   
0.0001 
 
0.0001 
 
0.0001 
 
0.0001 
 
0.0111 
 
0.0001 
 
Mean Across 5 Divisions  0.345 0.303 0.486 0.406 0.472 0.527 
Median Across 5 Divisions  0.316 0.265 0.500 0.396 0.438 0.474 
p-value (Kruskal-Wallis test)   0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
Number of Business-unit 
CEOs with available data  
35 35 36 34 17 16 
 
 
Table IV 
Business-Unit Investment Rates, Managerial Power and Cash Windfalls 
                    
This table shows the average annual investment rates (capital expenditures/total assets) of the conglomerate’s business units (BU) and 
matched stand-alone  firms (MSF). Average investment rates are calculated over the period from 2002 to 2006. Panel A provides an 
initial view of the role of managerial power and connections. The panel is constructed as follows. For each of the six indices of power 
or connections, Panel A splits business units into two subsamples. First, for each year and business unit we calculate the average value 
of each index. Second, we calculate the median values across the business-unit-years and split the sample. For each measure of power, 
a business-unit-year is in the high-power group if the power measure is above the median of the sample and in the low-power group if 
it is below it. The panel shows average investment rates for business units in the two subsamples and indicates whether the difference 
in investment rates is statistically different from zero. For each subsample, we also show the investment rates of matched stand-alone 
firms. Panel B splits business units into two subsamples based on the difference between capital expenditures in cash-windfall and no-
cash-windfall quarters. A business unit belongs to the high-allocation subsample if the difference in allocation between cash-windfall 
and no-cash-windfall quarters is above the median and it belongs to the low-allocation subsample if the difference is below the 
median. Colum three of both Panels reports the difference in mean investment rates between the high- and low- groups and its 
statistical significance. Column six reports the difference in mean investment rates between the MSF of high- and low- BU groups and 
its statistical significance. Finally, columns seven and eight report whether the difference in investment rates of the business units in 
the high- and low- group and the investment rates of matched stand-alone firms (BU-MSF) is statistically different from zero, 
respectively. The numbers of observations in each group are reported in brackets. Detailed definitions of each variable are provided in 
Appendix A-1. *** indicates significance at 1%, ** indicates significance at 5%, and * indicates significance at 10%. 
 
Panel A: Power of Business Units and Investment Rates 
 
Business units [BU]   Matched Stand-alone  Firms [MSF]   Difference [BU-MSF] 
High  
Power 
  Low  
Power 
  Difference 
[H-L]   
High  
Power  
  Low  
Power 
  Difference 
[H-L]   
High  
Power 
Low  
Power 
Career at the Firm 
0.061  0.033  0.028***  0.040  0.036  0.005  0.021*** -0.003 
[43]   [45]       [170]   [295]           
CEO Similarity 
0.057  0.037  0.020**  0.040  0.043  -0.003  0.017*** -0.007 
[43]   [45]       [245]   [215]           
Power Index 
0.050  0.043  0.007  0.040  0.036  0.004  0.010 0.007 
[43]   [45]       [155]   [290]           
Networker 
0.070  0.032  0.038***  0.042  0.034  0.008  0.028*** -0.002 
[29]   [30]       [155]   [211]           
Division CEO Connection 
0.069  0.033  0.036***  0.042  0.035  0.007  0.027*** -0.002 
[29]   [25]       [155]   [225]           
Connected Networker 
0.069  0.033  0.036***  0.042  0.035  0.007  0.027*** -0.002 
[29]   [25]       [155]   [225]           
 
 
Panel B: Cash Windfalls and Investment Rates 
 
Business Units [BU]   Matched Stand-alone  Firms [MSF]   Difference [BU-MSF] 
High 
Proceeds 
from Cash 
Windfalls 
  Low 
Proceeds 
from Cash 
Windfalls 
  Difference 
[H-L] 
  
High 
Proceeds 
from Cash 
Windfalls 
  Low 
Proceeds 
from Cash 
Windfalls 
  Difference 
[H-L] 
  
High 
Proceeds 
from Cash 
Windfalls 
Low 
Proceeds 
from Cash 
Windfalls 
  
0.060  0.033  0.033***  0.041  0.036  0.005  0.019*** -0.003 
[43]   [45]       [160]   [300]           
 
 
Table V 
Planned Investment and Managerial Power and Connection 
 
This table presents OLS regressions for the twenty business units of the conglomerate. The dependent variable in all regressions (shown 
in the first row) is a business-unit’s quarterly planned capital expenditures over its total assets over the period from 01/2002 to 12/2006. 
We report seven regressions. The first regression does not include any managerial power index as a control. The following six 
regressions successively control for the managerial power indices indicated in the second row: Career at the Firm; CEO Similarity; 
Power Index; Networker; Division CEO Connection; and Connected Networker. All regressions also control for: Planned EBIT/Assets 
(lag); Planned Personnel/Total Assets; Planed Sales growth; EBIT Deviation from Plan/Total Assets (lag); Fourth-Quarter Dummy; and 
a constant (not shown). The number of business-unit quarters and business units in each regression are reported at the bottom of the 
table. Robust standard errors, clustered at business-unit level, are shown in brackets. All variables are Winsorized at 1%. Detailed 
definitions of each variable are provided in Appendix A-1. *** indicates significance at 1%, ** indicates significance at 5%, and * 
indicates significance at 10%.  
 
 Dependent Variable: Planned Capital Expenditures/Total Assets 
Managerial Power Indices: None 
Career at 
the Firm 
CEO 
Similarity 
Power 
Index Networker 
Division 
CEO 
Connection 
Connected 
Networker 
  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] 
        
Managerial Power Index (lag)  -0.0089 0.0028 0.0012 0.0010 0.0017 0.0055 
  [0.0066] [0.0044] [0.0055] [0.0022] [0.0024] [0.0045] 
Planned EBIT/Total Assets (lag) 0.0320** 0.0238** 0.0328** 0.0255** 0.0383** 0.0333* 0.0330* 
 [0.0116] [0.0084] [0.0121] [0.0089] [0.0155] [0.0164] [0.0161] 
Planned Personnel/Total Assets 0.0005** 0.0006*** 0.0005** 0.0006** 0.0007 0.0006 0.0006 
 [0.0002] [0.0002] [0.0002] [0.0002] [0.0004] [0.0004] [0.0004] 
Planned Sales Growth -0.0001 -0.0025 -0.0003 -0.0039 0.0069 0.0043 0.0043 
 [0.0057] [0.0031] [0.0056] [0.0040] [0.0081] [0.0087] [0.0087] 
EBIT Deviation from Plan/Total Assets (lag) 0.0069 0.0128 0.0086 0.0050 0.0199 0.0104 0.0059 
 [0.0306] [0.0236] [0.0299] [0.0264] [0.0472] [0.0569] [0.0567] 
Fourth-Quarter Dummy -0.0021** -0.0025** -0.0020* -0.0024** -0.0012 -0.0010 -0.0010 
 [0.0010] [0.0010] [0.0010] [0.0010] [0.0012] [0.0013] [0.0013] 
        
Business-Unit Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
        
Observations 215 184 207 183 107 99 99 
Number of Business Units 18 16 18 19 11 10 10 
Adjusted R-squared 0.068 0.099 0.062 0.083 0.018 -0.007 -0.006 
 
Table VI 
Cash-Windfall Regressions: Effects of Managerial Power and Connection 
 
Panel A of this table shows OLS regressions for the twenty business units of the conglomerate. The dependent variable in all regressions (shown in the first row) is the quarterly difference between a 
business unit's actual and planned capital expenditures over its total assets over the period from 01/2002 to 12/2006. We report nine regressions. The first three regressions (i.e., 1a, 1b and 1c) do not 
include any managerial power index as a control. The following six regressions successively control for the managerial power indices indicated in the second row: Career at the Firm; CEO Similarity; 
Power Index; Networker; Division CEO Connection; and Connected Networker. The last six regressions also control for the interaction of each of the managerial power indices and Ln(1+Cash 
Windfall). The coefficient of the interaction term and its standard error are multiplied by 1,000. All regressions, except the second one, also control for Ln(1 + Cash Windfall). All regressions, except 
the first one (i.e., 1a) also control for: Sales Growth; EBIT/Total Assets; EBIT Deviation from Plan/Total Assets (lag); Imputed Tobin's Q (lag); Fourth-Quarter Dummy; and a constant (not shown). 
Robust standard errors, clustered at business-unit level, are shown in brackets. All dependent variables and controls are Winsorized at 1%. Detailed definitions of each variable are provided in 
Appendix A-1. *** indicates significance at 1%, ** indicates significance at 5%, and * indicates significance at 10%. Panel B reports the economic effects of the managerial power indices, based on 
the estimates in Panel A. The economic effects are calculated for a cash windfall of €938 million, which equals the average cash inflow in a cash-windfall quarter during our period of analysis. The 
change in the dependent variable is calculated both if the managerial power index is low (25th percentile) and if it is high (75th percentile The increase in the dependent variable is compared with the 
average quarterly business-unit investment rate, calculated across all no-cash-windfall quarters.  
 
 
Panel A: OLS Regressions 
 Dependent Variable: (Capital Expenditures - Planned Capital Expenditures)/Total Assets  
Managerial Power Indices: None None None 
Career at the 
Firm 
CEO 
Similarity Power Index Networker 
Division CEO 
Connection 
Connected 
Networker 
  [1a] [1b] [1c] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] 
          
Managerial Power * Ln(1+Cash Windfall)     1.7392** 0.7924** 1.7080** 3.0234* 2.2885* 3.6446** 
    [0.7870] [0.3508] [0.6459] [1.5632] [1.0789] [1.4372] 
Managerial Power    0.0017 -0.0029 -0.0006 -0.0002 -0.0035 0.0007 
    [0.0056] [0.0049] [0.0066] [0.0043] [0.0060] [0.0116] 
Ln(1+Cash Windfall) 0.0006***  0.0006* -0.0001 0.0002 -0.0003 -0.0008* -0.0008* -0.0013** 
 [0.0002]  [0.0003] [0.0002] [0.0004] [0.0003] [0.0004] [0.0004] [0.0004] 
Sales Growth  0.0056*** 0.0032 0.0035* 0.0026 0.0037* 0.0006 0.0029 0.0022 
  [0.0018] [0.0022] [0.0019] [0.0022] [0.0019] [0.0051] [0.0046] [0.0047] 
EBIT/Total Assets  0.0227* 0.0248** 0.0232* 0.0208* 0.0248* 0.0053 0.0095 0.0097 
  [0.0115] [0.0097] [0.0128] [0.0106] [0.0135] [0.0238] [0.0246] [0.0244] 
EBIT Deviation from Plan/Total Assets (lag)  -0.0558*** -0.0565*** -0.0662*** -0.0614*** -0.0586*** -0.0644*** -0.0703*** -0.0732*** 
  [0.0172] [0.0172] [0.0183] [0.0176] [0.0165] [0.0180] [0.0192] [0.0225] 
Imputed Tobin's Q (lag)  0.0097 0.0095 0.0083 0.0093 0.0088 -0.0000 0.0023 0.0026 
  [0.0069] [0.0069] [0.0079] [0.0079] [0.0084] [0.0079] [0.0078] [0.0078] 
Fourth-Quarter Dummy  0.0025 0.0012 0.0013 0.0017 0.0011 0.0035 0.0026 0.0027 
  [0.0018] [0.0015] [0.0014] [0.0016] [0.0015] [0.0033] [0.0033] [0.0033] 
          
Business-Unit Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
          
Observations 359 299 299 246 270 242 141 133 133 
Number of Business Units 20 20 20 18 20 18 13 12 12 
Adjusted R-squared 0.034 0.111 0.128 0.100 0.106 0.089 0.076 0.064 0.075 
 
 
Table VI (continued) 
 
 
Panel B: Economic Effects of Managerial Power (for a Cash Windfall of 938m EUR)  
 
 
 
Managerial Power Indices: None None None 
Career at the 
Firm 
CEO 
Similarity Power Index Networker 
Division CEO 
Connection 
Connected 
Networker 
  [1a] [1b] [1c] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] 
          
Low Power and Connection          
(Variable at 25th percentile) n/a n/a n/a 0.076 0.250 0.264 0.400 0.333 0.367 
          
Estimated Change in LHS variable 0.0041 n/a 0.0041 0.0002 0.0027 0.0010 0.0028 -0.0003 0.0002 
Change in investment relative to average 41% n/a 41% 2% 27% 10% 28% -3% 2% 
investment rate in no-cash-windfall quarters (=0.01)        
          
High Power and Connection          
(Variable at 75th percentile) n/a n/a n/a 0.381 0.500 0.485 0.600 0.667 0.633 
          
Estimated Change in LHS variable 0.0041 n/a 0.0041 0.0039 0.0041 0.0036 0.0069 0.0050 0.0069 
Change in investment relative to average 41% n/a 41% 39% 41% 36% 69% 50% 69% 
investment rate in no-cash-windfall quarters (=0.01)        
          
Difference Economic Effects n/a n/a n/a 37% 14% 26% 41% 53% 67% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table VII 
Cash-Windfall Regressions: Robustness Checks 
 
This table presents regressions for the twenty business units of the conglomerate. The dependent variable (shown in the first row) in all 
regressions, except those in row F, is a business-unit’s quarterly planned capital expenditures over its total assets over the period from 
01/2002 to 12/2006. The table presents nine alternative specifications (one in each row) of the regressions in Table VI. Each cell in the 
table shows the coefficient and the standard error of the dependent variable on the interaction term of the managerial power index 
(shown in the second row) and Ln(1+Cash Windfall). The coefficient of the interaction term and its standard error are multiplied by 
1,000. All regressions, except those in row A, also control for: the managerial power index shown in the second row; Ln(1 + Cash 
Windfall); Sales Growth; EBIT/Total Assets; EBIT Deviation from Plan/Total Assets (lag); Imputed Tobin's Q (lag); Fourth-Quarter 
Dummy; and a constant. Specifications in row A report results from specifications including as additional controls: the managerial 
power index shown in the second row; Ln(1 + Cash Windfall); and a constant. Specifications in row B include Planned Sales Growth 
as an additional control. Specifications in row C include Total Assets as an additional control. Specifications in row D report results 
from pooled OLS regressions, without business-unit fixed effects, but with standard errors clustered at business-unit level. 
Specifications in row E are estimated as those in row D but without clustering of standard errors. Specification in row F estimate an 
AR(1) process for the error term. Specifications in row G use business-unit quarterly actual capital expenditures over total assets as the 
dependent variable. Specifications in row H exclude all observations of the two business units whose business line is not entirely 
unrelated to three windfalls resulting from the sale of equity stakes in firms that acted as suppliers to these two units. All regressions 
use quarterly data from 01/2002 to 12/2006. All dependent variables and controls are Winsorized at 1%. Detailed definitions of each 
variable are provided in Appendix A-1. *** indicates significance at 1%, ** indicates significance at 5%, and * indicates significance 
at 10%. 
 
 
 Dependent Variable: (Capital Expenditures - Planned Capital Expenditures) /Total Assets 
Managerial Power Indices: Career at the 
Firm 
CEO 
Similarity Power Index Networker 
Division CEO 
Connection 
Connected 
Networker 
  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
       
1.2082* 0.8158** 1.3260** 2.4768* 1.9525** 3.1726** A. Same as in Table VI but without controls 
[0.6477] [0.3417] [0.5413] [1.2451] [0.8589] [1.1416] 
       
1.7303** 0.8049** 1.7037** 3.0137* 2.3100* 3.6851** B. Controlling for planned measures of inv. 
opportunities (planned sales growth) [0.7993] [0.3400] [0.6581] [1.5889] [1.1204] [1.5080] 
       
1.6890** 0.7954** 1.6744** 2.9311* 2.2743* 3.5825** C. Controlling for size of BUs (total assets) 
[0.7759] [0.3433] [0.6332] [1.5918] [1.0539] [1.4809] 
       
1.3712* 0.9762*** 1.5908** 2.9814* 2.0183* 3.1408** D. OLS without fixed effects, standard errors 
clustered at BUs [0.6936] [0.3013] [0.5751] [1.3911] [0.9550] [1.3823] 
       
1.3712* 0.9762* 1.5908** 2.9814*** 2.0183* 3.1408* E. OLS without fixed effects, no clustering of 
standard errors [0.8164] [0.5480] [0.7846] [1.1130] [1.1889] [1.6728] 
       
F. AR(1) process for error term 2.1724** 1.2151 2.3452** 4.3305** 2.5124* 4.0659** 
 [0.8435] [0.9232] [1.0185] [1.9601] [1.2879] [1.8086] 
       
1.2669** 1.3238** 1.6214** 3.5758 3.9046** 5.6325** G. Capital Expenditures/Total Assets as 
dependent variable [0.5690] [0.5625] [0.6472] [2.0128] [1.7432] [2.2646] 
       
1.9323* 0.7983* 1.7535** 3.0234* 2.2885* 3.6482** H. Excluding all observations of BUs related 
to the origin of the cash windfalls [0.9824] [0.3802] [0.7503] [1.5632] [1.0789] [1.4328] 
 
 
 
 
 
Table VIII 
Sales Growth and Managerial Power and Connection 
 
This table shows OLS regressions for the twenty business units of the conglomerate. The dependent variable in all regressions (shown 
in the first row) is a business unit’s quarterly sales growth over the period from 01/2002 to 12/2006. We report seven regressions. The 
first regression does not include any managerial power index as a control. The following six regressions successively control for the 
managerial power indices (lag) indicated in the second row: Career at the Firm; CEO Similarity; Power Index; Networker; Division 
CEO Connection; and Connected Networker. All regressions also control for: Cash Flow from Operations/Total Assets; Capital 
Expenditure/Total Assets (lag); R&D Expenditure/Total Assets; Marketing Expenditure/Total Assets; Sales; Personnel/Total Assets; 
Fourth-Quarter Dummy; and a constant (not shown). The number of business-unit quarters and business units in each regression are 
reported at the bottom of the table. Robust standard errors, clustered at business-unit level, are shown in brackets. All dependent 
variables and  controls are Winsorized at 1%. Detailed definitions of each variable are provided in Appendix A-1. *** indicates 
significance at 1%, ** indicates significance at 5%, and * indicates significance at 10%. 
 
 Dependent Variable: Sales Growth 
Managerial Power Indices: None 
Career at 
the Firm 
CEO 
Similarity 
Power 
Index Networker 
Division 
CEO 
Connection 
Connected 
Networker 
  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] 
        
Managerial Power (lag)  -0.0348 -0.0211 -0.0415 -0.1591** -0.0832 -0.1890 
  [0.0480] [0.0471] [0.0604] [0.0611] [0.0836] [0.1229] 
Cash Flow from Operations/Total Assets 0.3582** 0.3898** 0.3621** 0.3604* 0.2073 0.2422 0.2226 
 [0.1576] [0.1816] [0.1671] [0.1730] [0.3526] [0.3424] [0.3425] 
Capital Expenditure/Total Assets (lag) -4.5018*** -4.6282*** -4.1294** -4.4621*** -3.7297* -3.6421* -3.6154* 
 [1.3886] [1.4195] [1.4754] [1.3204] [1.7338] [1.8023] [1.7683] 
R&D Expenditures/Total Assets -2.0536 -1.3396 -1.6973 -0.8320 -1.2708 -1.2213 -1.1423 
 [1.7338] [1.4911] [1.5921] [1.3781] [1.4747] [1.5162] [1.5556] 
Marketing Expenditures/Total Assets 2.5874*** 2.2650*** 2.7482*** 2.4884*** 3.8092*** 3.7295*** 3.7570*** 
 [0.8272] [0.7835] [0.7797] [0.7366] [1.0624] [1.0699] [1.0406] 
Sales 0.0007*** 0.0007** 0.0006*** 0.0007** 0.0012** 0.0012*** 0.0012*** 
 [0.0002] [0.0003] [0.0002] [0.0003] [0.0004] [0.0004] [0.0004] 
Personnel/Total Assets -0.0068 -0.0058 -0.0170 -0.0188 -0.0512*** -0.0461** -0.0499** 
 [0.0077] [0.0092] [0.0111] [0.0134] [0.0160] [0.0168] [0.0176] 
Fourth-Quarter Dummy 0.2080*** 0.1948*** 0.2104*** 0.1983*** 0.2088** 0.2050** 0.2073** 
 [0.0482] [0.0542] [0.0484] [0.0528] [0.0715] [0.0746] [0.0735] 
        
Business-Unit Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
        
Observations 390 304 341 296 175 167 167 
Number of Business Units 20 19 19 19 14 13 13 
Adjusted R-squared  0.485 0.491 0.499 0.505 0.555 0.551 0.554 
 
 
 Table IX 
Cash Windfall-Regressions: Controlling for Managerial Ability 
 
This table presents OLS regressions for the twenty business units of the conglomerate. The dependent variable in all regressions (shown 
in the first row) is the quarterly difference between a business unit's actual and planned capital expenditures over its total assets over the 
period from 01/2002 to 12/2006. We report seven regressions. The first regression of each panel does not include any managerial power 
index as a control. The following six regressions of each panel successively control for the managerial power indices indicated in the 
second row: Career at the Firm; CEO Similarity; Power Index; Networker; Division CEO Connection; and Connected Networker.  The 
last six regressions also control for the interaction of each of the managerial power indices and Ln(1+Cash Windfall). The coefficient of 
the interaction term and its standard error are multiplied by 1,000. All regressions also control for (not shown): Ln(1 + Cash Windfall); 
Sales Growth; EBIT/Total Assets; EBIT Deviation from Plan/Total Assets (lag); Imputed Tobin's Q (lag); and a Fourth-Quarter 
Dummy. Regressions in Panel A also include as controls an Elite University dummy and the interaction of Elite University and 
Ln(1+Cash Windfall). The coefficient of the interaction term and its standard error are multiplied by 1,000.  , is equal to one if a 
manager holds a degree from an elite university. In Regressions in Panel B also include as controls an External Director dummy and the 
interaction term of Executive Director and Ln(1+Cash Windfall). The coefficient of the interaction term and its standard error are 
multiplied by 1,000. Robust standard errors, clustered at business-unit level, are reported in brackets. All regressions include a 
constants, but the coefficient of the constant is not shown. All dependent variables and the controls are Winsorized at 1%. Detailed 
definitions of each variable are provided in Appendix A-1. *** indicates significance at 1%, ** indicates significance at 5%, and * 
indicates significance at 10%. 
 
 
Panel A: Elite University as Ability Control 
 Dependent Variable: (Capital Expenditures - Planned Capital Expenditures) /Total Assets  
Managerial Power Indices: None 
Career at 
the Firm 
CEO 
Similarity Power Index Networker 
Division 
CEO 
Connection 
Connected 
Networker 
  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] 
        
Managerial Power * Ln(1+Cash Windfall)   1.7972** 0.7821 1.7998** 3.4190** 2.2065* 3.7861** 
  [0.6968] [0.6058] [0.6508] [1.2376] [1.0066] [1.2954] 
Managerial Power  0.0005 -0.0041 -0.0026 -0.0092 -0.0030 -0.0041 
  [0.0037] [0.0033] [0.0044] [0.0056] [0.0053] [0.0096] 
Elite University * Ln(1+Cash Windfall)  -0.0008 -0.0004 -0.0008 -0.0004 -0.0001 -0.0004 -0.0001 
 [0.0004] [0.0004] [0.0005] [0.0004] [0.0005] [0.0005] [0.0004] 
Elite University     -0.0034 -0.0046** -0.0044* -0.0054** -0.0095** -0.0054* -0.0073*** 
 [0.0021] [0.0020] [0.0024] [0.0023] [0.0036] [0.0030] [0.0016] 
        
Business-Unit Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
        
Observations 274 246 270 242 141 133 133 
Number of Business Units 20 18 20 18 13 12 12 
Adjusted R-squared 0.132 0.117 0.130 0.107 0.069 0.057 0.068 
 
Panel B: External Director Positions as Ability Control 
 Dependent Variable: (Capital Expenditures - Planned Capital Expenditures) /Total Assets  
Managerial Power Indices: None 
Career at 
the Firm 
CEO 
Similarity 
Power 
Index Networker 
Division 
CEO 
Connection 
Connected 
Networker 
  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] 
        
Managerial Power * Ln(1+Cash Windfall)  1.7255** 0.9598* 1.6955** 3.3084** 2.2225** 3.7853** 
  [0.7397] [0.5008] [0.6561] [1.3168] [0.9773] [1.2727] 
Managerial Power  0.0009 -0.0050 -0.0020 -0.0069 -0.0043 -0.0066 
  [0.0048] [0.0045] [0.0059] [0.0044] [0.0046] [0.0092] 
External Director  * Ln(1+Cash Windfall) -0.0006 -0.0002 -0.0007 -0.0003 -0.0002 -0.0004 -0.0002 
 [0.0005] [0.0004] [0.0005] [0.0004] [0.0006] [0.0005] [0.0004] 
External Director    -0.0026 -0.0034 -0.0030 -0.0036 -0.0048 -0.0030 -0.0045 
 [0.0023] [0.0024] [0.0028] [0.0028] [0.0032] [0.0039] [0.0038] 
        
Business-Unit Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
        
Observations 295 246 270 242 141 133 133 
Number of Business Units 20 18 20 18 13 12 12 
Adjusted R-squared 0.139 0.107 0.121 0.096 0.066 0.055 0.065 
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Figure 1. Organizational Structure of the Conglomerate. This figure summarizes the organizational structure of the conglomerate. It shows the five divisions and the business units operating 
within the divisions. It illustrates, for example, that division 2 operates a total of eight business units. The divisions, which have no operating activities themselves, are run by division CEOs. The 
business units are the operating units and they are run by business-unit CEOs (BU CEOs). There are twenty business units in total. 
  
 
Panel A: Budgeting or Planning Stage 
 
Involved Party:
Involved Party:
March/April: 
Negotiations over long-
term business plans of 
Business Units
September/October: 
Negotiations over one-
year investment and 
allocation targets of 
Business Units
Executive Board 
(Headquarters)
October/November: 
Final decision on one-
year annual capital 
allocation plan for all 
Business Units
June: Based on Strategic 
Outlook, prepare one-year 
concrete investment and 
allocation targets 
Objective: Three-year long-term strategic plan ("guide")
Objective: One-year detailed capital allocation plan
April: Final decision on 
long-term business 
plans for Business Units 
(three-year strategic 
outlook)
February: Negotiations 
over long-term 
investment opport. 
Business Units March: Prelim. 
decisions on long-term 
business plans of 
Business Units
August: Prelim. 
decisions on one-year 
investment and 
allocation targets of 
Business Units
Phase 1: Strategic Outlook for Business Units
January: Start identifying 
long-term investment opport. 
and present them to Division 
CEO/CFO
Business Unit CEO
July: Negotiations over 
one-year investment 
and allocation targets of 
Business UnitsDivision CEO
Business Unit CEO
Division CEO
Executive Board 
(Headquarters)
Phase 2: Annual Capital Allocation Plan for Business Units
Planning and Negotiations
Planning and Negotiations
Our data source: 
Annual Capital Allocation Plan
  
 
 
 
  
 
Panel B: Realization or Execution Stage 
Involved Party:
Memo on Investment 
Proposal: Contains three 
documents: (1) Signing 
Form, (2) Investment 
Description, (3) Output 
NPV Calculator
Memo on Investment 
Proposal: Contains three 
documents: (1) Signing 
Form, (2) Investment 
Description, (3) Output 
NPV Calculator
Business Unit CEO
Division CEO
Division CEO decides on 
Proposal: Approval or 
Rejection
Executive Board 
(Headquarters)
Investment Proposal: Business 
Unit wants to execute an 
investment that has been 
budgeted
NPV Calculator: Business 
Unit calculates NPV of 
proposed investment using 
standardized excel 
spreedshet
Headquarters provides 
inputs for NPV Calculator: 
Interest Rates, Cost of 
Debt, Cost of Equity, Tax 
Rates
Executive Board decides 
on Proposal: Approval or 
Rejection
Execution of Investment 
(Order, Letter of Intent, 
Signing of Contract, 
Payment, etc.)
Investment Authorization
Input
Our data source: 
Actual Capital Expenditures
If investment > Threshold Amount 
If investment < Threshold Amount 
If Approved
If Approved
 
 
Figure 2. Decision Process behind Allocation of Capital: Budgeting and Realization Stages. This figure presents the details of the capital allocation process of the conglomerate. Panel A 
shows the budgeting (i.e.,planning stage), and Panel B shows the realization (i.e., execution) stage. The budgeting consists of two different phases: the strategic outlook phase and the annual 
capital allocation phase. The figure shows how these two phases relate to each other, who the parties are, and when what kinds of decisions are made. A detailed verbal description of the capital 
allocation process is provided in Appendix A-3. 
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Figure 3. Planned versus Actual Capital Expenditures: Over-Budgeting by Business Units. This figure provides a scatter plot of 
planned capital expenditures (x-axis) and actual capital expenditures (y-axis) of the business units of the conglomerate. The figure 
uses annual averages of quarterly data from 01/2002 to 12/2006. The figure also contains at the 45-degree line to indicate whether 
planned capital expenditures are above (lower half of the figure) or below (upper half of the figure) actual expenditures. Planned 
capital expenditures are above (below) actual expenditures for 83% (17%) of the observations. This suggests that the business units 
systematically over budget their capital expenditures.  
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Importance of Cash Windfalls Relative to Firm Level Variables
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Figure 4. Magnitude of Cash Windfalls. The figure documents the size of the cash windfalls relative to the conglomerate’s sales, 
total assets, cash flow from operations, capital expenditures, and EBIT. The conglomerate experienced eight cash windfalls resulting 
from headquarters’ sales of equity stakes in other companies. The equity sales occurred in the years 2003 (one sale), 2004 (three 
sales), and 2005 (four sales). The figure shows the aggregate value of the cash windfalls during each year relative to total aggregate 
conglomerate values of the same year.  
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Figure 5. Capital Expenditures in Cash-Windfall and No-Cash-Windfall Quarters. This figure illustrates actual minus planned 
capital expenditures, standardized by total assets, of the business units of the firm in cash-windfall and no-cash-windfall quarters. The 
table reports mean and median values, calculated over the respective business-unit quarters. Negative numbers suggest that actual 
investment is less than planned investment. The means (-0.0060 versus -0.0024) as well as the medians (-0.0049 versus -0.0024) are 
statistically different from each other at the 1% level.      
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Figure 6. Partial Scatter Plots. This figure presents partial scatter plots of the interaction term between a proxy for managerial 
power or connection and the cash-windfall variable. The dependent variable is the difference between actual and planned capital 
expenditures, scaled by total assets. Each regression uses the same controls and the same specifications as the regressions in Table VI.  
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Figure 7. Economic Effect of Power and Connections. This figure illustrates the economic effects of power and connection. It 
reports the change in investment relative to planned investment (i.e., the change in actual minus planned investment, standardized by 
total assets) when our proxies for power or connection are low and high, respectively. A power or connection proxy is considered low 
(high) if the variable is at the 25th (75th) percentile. The changes in investment are calculated for a cash windfall of €938 million, 
which equals the average proceeds from cash windfalls in cash-windfall quarters. The figures are calculated based on the estimates in 
Table VI and correspond with those in Panel B of Table VI.   
 
              
Appendix A-1: Definition of Variables 
 
This table provides definitions of the variables used in the paper.  
 
Variable Description 
1. Financial Variables  
Number of Business Units Number of business units that operate under the umbrella of a division. Divisions 
themselves have no operating activities. The data is from the flow chart of the firm and the 
organizational structure did not change over the sample period.  
Capital Expenditures Investments in tangible and intangible assets (in EUR). We have both planned (budgeted) 
and actual data. The planned data is available on a quarterly basis, while the actual data is 
available on a monthly basis but added across the three months of a quarter to compare it 
with the planned data. The data is from the internal management accounting system of the 
firm. 
Sales Proceeds from the sales of products or services to third parties and other divisions inside 
the firm (in EUR). We have both planned (budgeted) and actual data. The planned 
(budgeted) data is available on a quarterly basis, whereas the actual data is available on a 
monthly basis but added across the three months of a quarter to compare it with the 
planned data. The data is from the internal management accounting system of the firm. 
Sales Growth Difference between this period’s sales and previous period’s sales divided by previous 
period’s sales. We have both planned (budgeted) and actual data. The data is from the 
internal management accounting system of the firm. 
EBIT Earnings before interest payments and taxes (in EUR). We have both planned (budgeted) 
and actual data. The planned data is available on a quarterly basis, whereas the actual data 
is available on a monthly basis but added across the three months of a quarter to compare 
it with the planned data. The data is from the internal management accounting system of 
the firm. 
EBIT Deviation from Plan Difference between the planned and actual value of EBIT (in EUR). The data is from the 
internal management accounting system of firm. 
Total Assets Sum of the book values of fixed and current assets (in EUR). We have both planned 
(budgeted) and actual data. The planned data is available on a quarterly basis, whereas the 
actual data is available on a monthly basis but averaged across the three months of a 
quarter to compare it with the planned data. The data is from the internal management 
accounting system of the firm. 
Cash Flow from Operations Net income, plus depreciation and amortization, and plus (minus) decreases (increases) in 
working capital (in EUR). We have both planned (budgeted) and actual data. The planned 
data is available on a quarterly basis, whereas the actual data is available on a monthly 
basis but added across the three months of a quarter to compare it with the planned data. 
The data is from the internal management accounting system of the firm. 
Personnel Number of employees, calculated as full-time equivalents. We have both planned 
(budgeted) and actual data. The planned data is available on a quarterly basis, whereas the 
actual data is available on a monthly basis but averaged across the three months of a 
quarter to compare it with the planned data. The data is from the internal management 
accounting system of the firm. 
R&D Expenditures Expenses related to research and development activities (in EUR). We have both planned 
(budgeted) and actual data. The planned data is available on a quarterly basis, while the 
actual data is available on a monthly basis but added across the three months of a quarter 
to compare it with the planned data. The data is from the internal management accounting 
system of the firm. 
Marketing Expenditures Expenses related to the marketing and selling of products and services (in EUR). We have 
both planned (budgeted) and actual data. The planned data is available on a quarterly 
basis, while the actual data is available on a monthly basis but added across the three 
months of a quarter to compare it with the planned data. The data is from the internal 
management accounting system of the firm. 
Imputed Tobin’s Q The median value of Tobin’s Q for all firms from the European Union with the same 
three-digit SIC code. The variable is constructed based on data from Compustat and 
Compustat Global.  
Total Debt Total interest-bearing debt (in EUR or USD). The data is from Compustat and Compustat 
Global. 
Cash Holdings Cash and marketable securities (in EUR or USD). The data is from Compustat and 
Compustat Global. 
Dividends Dividends paid to shareholders (in EUR or USD). The data is from Compustat and 
Compustat Global. 
Business Unit Equal to one if an observation is from one of the twenty business units of the 
 conglomerate, and zero otherwise. 
Fourth Quarter Dummy Equal to one if an observation is from the fourth quarter of the calendar year, and zero 
otherwise. The variable is included to account for the seasonality in the business of the 
firm. 
2. Cash Windfall Variable 
Cash Windfall  Cash inflow at headquarters that results from the selling of equity stakes in other firms (in 
million EUR). Headquarters had equity stakes in other firms that were sold and resulted in 
eight large cash windfalls during the sample period. The variable is self-constructed based 
on annual reports from the firm, press statements, and a web search. 
3. Managerial Power and Connection Variables  
Career at the Firm This index measures the career a manager has made at the conglomerate and a manager’s 
general social network at the workplace. It is formed by averaging the following three 
variables: (1) Number of months during which a manager had an overlap inside a unit of 
the conglomerate with a person, which later became an executive board member. (This can 
be the case, for example, if a manager worked at the same time in the same business unit 
of the firm as the CFO); (2) Number of years a manager has been working for the firm; (3) 
Number of years a manager has been working in a powerful position inside the firm (e.g., 
division CEO, business-unit CEO, or head of marketing). All three variables are 
normalized before entering the index to fall between zero and one, using the respective 
minimum and maximum values. All variables entering the index are self-constructed 
based on data from BoardEx, ZoomInfo, social networking web pages (LinkedIn, 
Facebook, MySpace), annual reports, and systematic web and newspaper searches. This 
data is complemented with data from a survey among the managers, which we developed 
and ran ourselves. Details on the index construction and the variables it contains are 
reported in Appendix A-2. 
CEO Similarity This index measures the similarity of the personal profile of a manager with that of the 
CEO. It is formed by averaging the following four dummy variables: (1) Dummy, which is 
equal to one if a manager speaks the native language of the CEO; (2) Dummy, which is 
equal to one if a manager lives in the country in which the CEO lives; (3) Dummy, which 
is equal to one if a manager went to the same university as the CEO; (4) Dummy, which is 
equal to one if a manager graduated in the same academic discipline (engineering) as the 
CEO. All variables entering the index are self-constructed based on data from BoardEx, 
ZoomInfo, social networking web pages (LinkedIn, Facebook, MySpace), annual reports, 
and systematic web and newspaper searches. This data is complemented with data from a 
survey among the managers, which we developed and ran ourselves. Details on the index 
construction and the variables it contains are reported in Appendix A-2. 
Power Index This index is formed by averaging the two indexes: (1) Career at the Firm; and (2) CEO 
Similarity.  
Networker This index measures the extent to which a manager undertakes networking activities. The 
index is formed by averaging the following five dummy variables: (1) Dummy, which is 
equal to one if a manager is a member in a fraternity; (2) Dummy, which is equal to one if 
a manager is a member of a social club inside the firm; (3) Dummy, which is equal to one 
if a manager regularly stops by headquarters to say “Hello”; (4) Dummy, which is equal to 
one if a manager  regularly accepts highly visible work assignments; (5) Dummy, which is 
equal to one if a manager participated regularly in highly visible task forces or 
committees. All variables entering this index are self-constructed based on a survey, which 
we developed and ran ourselves among the managers. The survey questions underlying 
items (3)-(5) are based on Forret and Dougherty (2001, 2004). Details on the index 
construction and the variables it contains are reported in Appendix A-2. 
Division CEO Connection This index measures how well a manager is connected to a division CEO. The index is 
formed by averaging the following variables: (1) Dummy, which is equal to one if a 
manager has a division CEO as a personal mentor; (2) Dummy, which is equal to one if a 
manager goes at least occasionally for lunch with the Division CEO; (3) Dummy, which is 
equal to one if a manager meets the division CEO in person at least every two weeks. All 
variable entering this index are self-constructed based on a survey, which we developed 
and ran ourselves among the managers. The survey question underlying item (1) is based 
on Podolny and Baron (1997), and the survey question underlying item (2) is based on 
Forret and Dougherty (2001, 2004). Details on the index construction and the variables it 
contains are reported in Appendix A-2. 
Connected Networker This index is formed by averaging the two indexes: (1) Networker; and (2) Division CEO 
Connection.  
  
4. Managerial Ability Variables 
External Director  Equal to one if a manager holds a non-executive director position outside the 
conglomerate in addition to his management position inside the firm during the period of 
our analysis (i.e., 2002-2006), and zero otherwise. The variable is self-constructed based 
on data from BoardEx, ZoomInfo, social networking web pages (LinkedIn, Facebook, 
MySpace), annual reports, and systematic web and newspaper searches. This data has been 
complemented with data from a survey among the managers, which we developed and ran 
ourselves. 
Elite University  Equal to one if a manager has a degree from an elite university, and zero otherwise. For 
our analysis, elite universities include the Ivy League schools in the US as well as the five 
leading business schools in Europe according to the Financial Times Business School 
Ranking. The variable is self-constructed based on data from BoardEx, ZoomInfo, social 
networking web pages (LinkedIn, Facebook, MySpace), annual reports, and systematic 
web and newspaper searches. This data has been complemented with data from a survey 
among the managers, which we developed and ran ourselves. 
 
 
 
  
Appendix A-2: Details on Components of Power and Connection Indices 
 
This table provides details on the components of the power and connection indices used in the paper. It contains details on the coding 
of the variables as well as summary statistics.  
 
1. Career at the Firm 
 
(1) Number of months during which a manager coincided at a unit of the conglomerate with a person who later became an executive 
board member.  
Mean Median Std. dev. Obs. 
62 24 92 39 
 
(2) Number of years a manager has been working for the firm. 
Mean Median Std. dev. Obs. 
12.1 5.2 11.0 39 
 
(3) Number of years a manager has been working in a powerful position inside the firm. 
Mean Median Std. dev. Obs. 
5.5 3.5 5.7 37 
 
2. CEO Similarity 
 
(1) Dummy, which is equal to one if a manager speaks the native language of the CEO (=Yes). 
 
Yes No Obs. 
52.5% 47.5% 40 
 
(2) Dummy, which is equal to one if a manager lives in the country in which the CEO lives (=Yes). 
 
Yes No Obs. 
70% 30% 40 
 
(3) Dummy, which is equal to one if a manager went to the same university as the CEO (=Yes). 
 
Yes No Obs. 
11% 89% 37 
 (4) Dummy, which is equal to one if a manager graduated in the same academic discipline (engineering) as the CEO (=Yes). 
 
Yes No Obs. 
53% 47% 36 
 
3. Power Index 
 
This index builds on the previous two indices. 
 
4. Networker 
 
(1) Are you a member of a fraternity? _ Yes _ No 
 
Yes No Obs. 
30% 70% 20 
 
(2) During your time as business-unit CEO, were you a member of one of the following clubs at (COMPANY)? Club 1: _ Yes _ No; 
Club 2: _ Yes _ No; Club 3: _ Yes _ No  
 
Yes No Obs. 
21% 79% 19 
 
We code this dummy as equal to one if a manager is a member of at least one club. 
 
(3) During your last year as business-unit CEO, how often did you conduct the following activity to increase your visibility within 
(COMPANY) (please mark)? Stopping by division headquarters to say “hello”? 
  
Never Seldom, only 
once or twice 
Occasionally, several 
times a year 
Moderately often, 
every few week 
Often, almost 
every week 
Very often, 
almost every 
day 
Obs. 
11% 24% 12% 23% 18% 12% 17 
 
We create a dummy for this survey question, which is equal to one if a manager regularly stops by headquarters to say “hello”. This is 
the case if the answer is “moderately often, every few weeks”, or more frequently.  
 
(4) During your last year as business-unit CEO, how often did you conduct the following activity to increase your visibility within 
(COMPANY) (please mark)? Accepting new, highly visible work assignments? 
 
Never Seldom, only 
once or twice 
Occasionally, several 
times a year 
Moderately often, 
every few weeks 
Often, almost 
every week 
Very often, 
almost every 
day 
Obs. 
18% 18% 35% 18% 6% 6% 17 
 
We create a dummy for this survey question, which is equal to one if a manager regularly accepts new visible work assignments. This 
is the case if the answer is “Occasionally, several times a year”, or more frequently.  
 
(5) During your last year as business-unit CEO, how often did you conduct the following activity to increase your visibility within 
(COMPANY) (please mark)? Being on highly visible task forces or committees at work? 
 
Never Seldom, only 
once or twice 
Occasionally, several 
times a year 
Moderately often, 
every few weeks 
Often, almost 
every week 
Very often, 
almost every 
day 
Obs. 
17% 17% 44% 11% 6% 6% 18 
 
We create a dummy for this survey question, which is equal to one if a manager regularly sits on highly visible task forces or 
committees at work. This is the case if the answer is “Occasionally, several times a year”, or more frequently.  
 
5. Division CEO Connection 
 
(1) During your time as business-unit CEO/CFO, were there any division CEOs you regarded as a guide/mentor—that is, someone 
who has taken a strong interest in your professional development over the last year at (COMPANY) /in the past by providing you 
with opportunities and/or access to facilitate your career advancement? 
 
Yes No Obs. 
50% 50% 18 
 (2) During your last year as business-unit CEO, how often did you conduct the following activities to increase your visibility within 
(COMPANY) (please mark)? Going to lunch with your division CEO? 
 
Never Seldom, only 
once or twice 
Occasionally, several 
times a year 
Moderately often, 
every few weeks 
Often, almost 
every week 
Very often, 
almost every 
day 
Obs. 
23% 23% 29% 12% 12% 0% 17 
 
We create a dummy for this survey question, which is equal to one if a manager regularly goes for lunch with his division CEO 
“occasionally, several times a year”, or more frequently.  
 
(3) During your time as business-unit CEO/CFO, how often did you meet the CEO of your division in person?  
Every day Twice a week Once a week Every two weeks Once a month Not during the 
last month 
Obs. 
0% 26% 11% 16% 32% 16% 19 
 
We create a dummy for this survey question, which is equal to one if a manager meets the division CEO “every two weeks”, or more 
frequently.  
 
6. Connected Networker 
 
This index builds on the previous two indices. 
  
Appendix A-3: Detailed Description of the Capital Allocation Process  
 
 
  To understand whether and where the intra-firm bargaining power of managers plays a 
role for capital allocations, we have access to information describing the capital allocation process 
of the firm. We can use documents on (i) the institutional details of the allocation process, provided, 
for example, in the budgeting manual of the firm, (ii) the time-line of budgeting meetings, (iii) the 
managers who participate in these meetings, (iv) the approval procedures for investments, and (v) a 
net present value calculator for project evaluation. The internal capital allocation process itself is 
reported consists of two general stages: a budgeting or planning stage and a realization or execution 
stage.  
 
A. Budgeting or Planning Stage 
 
  In the budgeting stage, the firm transforms the general corporate strategy into capital 
allocations (budgets) using a two-phase process, which is anchored on the elaboration of two key 
documents for each business unit: (1) the strategic outlook, and (2) the annual capital allocation 
plan. The firm has a very standardized two-phase process for transforming this general corporate 
strategy into concrete capital allocations and investment decisions.  
 
Phase 1: Strategic Outlook for Business Units 
The objective of the first phase is to develop a three-year strategic outlook (“guide”) for all 
business units of the firm. An important aspect of the strategic outlook is to have discussions 
between division and business-unit CEOs and the executive board on long-run strategies of the 
divisions and their business units.  
Therefore, in January the business-unit CEOs start identifying long-term growth and 
investment opportunities of their business units and the lines of business operating within the 
business units. These opportunities refer to projects with horizons over several years and are 
supposed to be consistent with the general strategy of the firm, as outlined by the executive board. 
The developed business plans are then presented by the business-unit CEOs to the respective 
division CEOs. In February, negotiations in special budget meetings take place between the 
business-unit CEOs and the corresponding division CEOs over these identified opportunities, with 
preliminary decisions on the implied business plans being made by the division CEOs in March. 
Each division CEO and his business-unit CEOs then present the three-year business plans of their 
units, using standardized forms (so-called budget forms), to the executive board and negotiate over 
revisions and adjustments.  
 The negotiations are coordinated, scheduled, and structured by corporate control, a 
centralized support function at headquarters, which also provides sample forms and records as well 
as a budget manual to the divisions and their business units. Corporate control runs additional 
checks and analyses of the presented plans and attempts to ensure that the process is completed 
according to the budget time-line. Corporate control also issues guidelines to the divisions to ensure 
that the strategies of the divisions are consistent with the overall strategy of the firm and to 
standardize the documents, financials and presentations that are provided to the executive board. 
Following the negotiations among the executive board and the unit managers, a final decision on 
the figures in the strategic outlook is being made in a meeting of the executive board in April. 
The strategic outlook includes general targets for planned investments and required resource 
allocations for all units. It thereby serves as the foundation for the internal capital allocation process. 
As described, the process is highly institutionalized and structured, with decisions being made for 
the three-year period starting in January of the subsequent year.  
 
Phase 2: Annual Capital Allocation Plan for Business Units 
Just after the finalization of the strategic outlook, a concrete annual capital allocation plan 
(or capital budget) is developed for the coming year. The annual capital allocation plan is a one-
year investment plan containing detailed resource allocations for all business units.  
The link between the strategic outlook and the allocation plan is the breaking down of the 
business plans for the setting of very concrete investment targets. The annual capital allocation plan 
usually starts with the projection of revenues and associated costs for the respective business units, 
usually build on estimates per line of business and sometimes even per product. Based on the 
estimates, the units derive the investment and capital allocation targets needed to fulfill these 
projections. These targets comprise targets for capital expenditures, marketing expenditures, R&D 
expenditures, and, at headquarters, expenditures for M&A. The annual allocation plan therefore 
translates into a complete set of pro forma balance sheets, income statements, and cash flow 
statements for each business unit, which are subsequently aggregated and consolidated at division 
as well as firm level. 
Discussions about the annual allocation plan start in June with the division CEOs, based on 
the strategic outlook, preparing investment and allocation targets for the coming year. The 
business-unit and division CEOs then jointly negotiate in July over these allocation plans and make 
revisions and adjustments. Preliminary decisions on the budgets are made in August. As in the 
strategic outlook, the division and business-unit CEOs then present the capital allocation plan for 
their divisions to the executive board using standardized forms and a second round of in-depth joint 
negotiations and revisions takes place. These negotiations take place in September and October. As 
in the strategic outlook, the negotiations are coordinated, scheduled, and structured by corporate 
control. Finally, in October or November, the executive board decides on the investment and 
 allocation targets for the coming year. The plan is then presented by the executive board to the 
supervisory board for final approval, which is usually a formality.  
The divisions and business units then receive the approved plan and prepare the 
implementations for the coming year. As illustrated in Appendix A-7, our data source is this annual 
capital allocation plan. We have data from five annual capital allocation plans, from 2002 to 2006, 
each containing quarterly plans and budgets for all 20 business units of the firm. Once the annual 
capital allocation plan is approved, it also serves as a foundation for headquarters’ financing and 
fiscal planning for the year ahead. 
As suggested by the above descriptions, the budgeting process and the resulting capital 
allocation of the firm tries to combine top-down and bottom-up elements to enable collaboration 
and information aggregation between lower and top management.     
 
B. Realization or Execution Stage 
 
It is during the realization or execution stage that concrete investments are made and the 
corresponding cash outflows are generated. Decisions here are made much more quickly than they 
are during budgeting. All investments (buying or replacing small machines or IT, for example) 
below the investment thresholds can be made, quickly and easily, with simple procedures at the 
discretion of the business units.  
Although the annual capital allocation plan is the basis for investments by the business units, 
the firm requires additional approvals for the execution of any project in the plan that involves 
investments or divestments in tangible or intangible fixed assets that exceed a specific threshold. 
The thresholds depend on the divisions and on their capital intensity.   
If the proposed investment exceeds the threshold, the business unit must prepare, for 
approval by the division CEO and the executive board, an investment memo that contains (1) a 
document to be signed by the executive board, (2) a document describing the investment, and (3) a 
net present value calculation. The project description should explain the reason for and the risks the 
investment and discuss of the alternatives. Each business unit must show that the investment will 
generate as a minimum requirement a positive NPV. For this reason, the company has constructed 
an NPV calculator, a spreadsheet provided by headquarters that all units must use to evaluate 
projects.   
As the discount rate for the NPV calculation, the firm uses a project-specific weighted 
average cost of capital (WACC), provided by headquarters. The input on interest rates, cost of debt 
and country-risk premia used for the calculation of the WACC are provided by the corporate 
treasury, a department at the headquarters. Tax rates are provided by the corporate tax department, 
also at headquarters.  
 The NPV of a project is not the only relevant approval criteria and when it comes to 
deciding which positive NPV projects are being executed, other things such as strategic fit, the cash 
flow structure, past performance or reputation of the business-unit CEOs also play a role. 
Taking into account all factors, the executive board makes a final decision on the 
investment approval and subsequently informs the business unit of its final decision by automated 
email. After that, the business units can place an order, assign a letter of intent or contract or make 
a payment. Headquarters then provides the corresponding actual allocation of funds so that the 
investment can be executed. 
Two years after the approval of a project by the executive board, the firm requires the filing 
of a post-investment report that documents the extent to which was consistent with the figures in 
the NPV calculator, and where and why deviations occurred.  
The company applies the OECD principles on transfer prices for all within-firm sales. In 
other words, transfers within the firm are priced using the arm’s-length principle, that is, transfer 
prices should be the same as if the two divisions or business units involved were two independent 
firms not part of the same conglomerate. Any significant reallocation of capital from one unit to 
another through transfer prices is therefore unlikely. 
 
  
Appendix A-4: Descriptive Statistics 
              
This table presents descriptive statistics of the variables used in the paper. The variables are calculated based on quarterly data from 
01/2002 to 12/2006. Panel A provides descriptive statistics of financial variables of the business units. The statistics are based on data 
from the internal management accounting system of the conglomerate and calculated across all twenty business units of the 
conglomerate. Panel B reports statistics of the cash-windfall variable. The statistics are calculated and reported across the six cash - 
quarters. Panel C reports variables proxying for the power and connection of the business-unit CEOs. Panel D provides variables that 
proxy for ability of business-unit CEOs. Detailed definitions of each variable are provided in Appendix A-1. Correlations are reported 
in Appendix A-6. 
 
Panel A: Financial Variables of Business Units       
       
 Obs. Mean Median Std. dev. 25% 75% 
Planned Sales (millions) 391 369 227 386 121 416 
Planned EBIT/Total Assets 391 0.043 0.038 0.065 0.006 0.069 
Planned Sales Growth 371 0.058 0.057 0.268 -0.016 0.163 
Planned Cash Flow from Operations/Total Assets 215 0.052 0.046 0.102 0.009 0.099 
Planned Capital Expenditures (millions) 359 12.9 4.9 25.5 3.3 11.0 
Planned Capital Expenditures/Total Assets 359 0.016 0.012 0.013 0.006 0.023 
Planned R&D Expenditures/Total Assets 211 0.040 0.030 0.041 0.021 0.044 
Planned Marketing Expenditures/Total Assets 215 0.101 0.077 0.087 0.052 0.134 
Planned Personnel  (# of employees) 215 6780 4113 7976 2725 7956 
Sales (millions) 391 345 219 370 108 392 
EBIT/Total Assets 391 0.032 0.034 0.096 -0.006 0.068 
Sales Growth 370 0.041 0.026 0.270 -0.085 0.153 
Cash Flow from Operations/Total Assets 391 0.051 0.043 0.118 0.001 0.099 
Capital Expenditures (millions) 391 9.6 3.5 21.9 1.8 8.4 
Capital Expenditures/Total Assets 391 0.011 0.007 0.013 0.004 0.017 
R&D Expenditures/Total Assets 391 0.035 0.029 0.029 0.018 0.047 
Marketing Expenditures/Total Assets 391 0.098 0.080 0.066 0.049 0.148 
Personnel  (# of employees) 391 6537 3929 8028 1982 7657 
Imputed Tobin's Q 391 1.690 1.799 0.396 1.324 1.961 
(Capital Expenditures - Planned Capital Expenditures)/Total Assets 359 -0.005 -0.004 0.011 -0.010 0.001 
EBIT Deviation from Plan/Total Assets 311 0.000 0.001 0.021 -0.009 0.012 
       
Panel B: Cash-Windfall Variable       
       
Obs. across Cash-Windfall Quarters (i.e. if cash windfalls>0) Obs. Mean Median Std. dev. 25% 75% 
Cash Windfall (millions) 132 938 903 258 672 1265 
 
Panel C: Managerial Power Variables        
       
 Obs. Mean Median Std. dev. 25% 75% 
Career at the Firm 321 0.252 0.163 0.234 0.076 0.381 
CEO Similarity 346 0.486 0.500 0.213 0.250 0.500 
Power Index 313 0.377 0.311 0.198 0.264 0.485 
Networker 174 0.468 0.400 0.202 0.400 0.600 
Division CEO Connection 166 0.552 0.667 0.274 0.333 0.667 
Connected Networker 166 0.497 0.533 0.198 0.367 0.633 
 
Panel D: Managerial Ability Variables       
       
 Obs. Mean Median Std. dev. 25% 75% 
External Director  387 0.32 0.00 0.47 0.00 1.00 
Elite University  354 0.35 0.00 0.48 0.00 1.00 
  
Appendix A-5: Description of Cash Windfalls 
   
This table presents a summarized description of eight cash windfalls, which occurred at the conglomerate’s headquarters. During the 
sample period of 2002 to 2006, the headquarters of the conglomerate sold eight equity stakes in other firms and generated cash 
inflows of more than €500 million for each sale. The cash windfalls occurred in six different quarters—Q4 2003, Q3 2004, Q4 2004 
(two windfalls), Q2 2005, Q3 2005 (two windfalls), and Q4 2005. Panel A presents whether the stakes were related to the activities 
of the business units, the stated reasons for the sale, the procedure by which the stake was sold, and the size of the pre- and post-sale 
stake (in % of the shares of the firm whose equity was sold). It also contains information on how long the firm has held the equity 
stakes. Panel B presents information on the use to which the windfalls were put. The statistics in Panel A are constructed based on 
information from company news reports as well as newspaper articles. The figures in Panel B are calculated based on the cash flow 
statements of the firm in the quarters in which cash windfalls occurred. We assume that an additional cash from the cash windfalls is, 
on aggregate, used in the same way as an additional cash from other operating or financing sources in a cash-windfall quarter. 
   
Panel A: Description of Cash Windfalls     
   
Unrelated to Activities of Business Units Yes 5 
(# of Equity Stakes) No 3 
   
   
Stated Reason for Equity Sale # Non-strategic asset 6 
(multiple reasons possible) # Exploit high market value 3 
 # Reduce exposure to cyclical industry 2 
   
Procedure of Sale of Equity Stake # Initial Public Offering (IPO) 1 
 # Seasoned Equity Offering (SEO) 4 
 # OTC Transaction (OTC) 3 
   
Pre-Sale Equity Stake Mean 32% 
 Median 29% 
   
After-Sale Equity Stake Mean 16% 
 Median 16% 
   
Holding Period of Equity Stake Mean 12 
(years) Median 11 
   
Panel B: Usage of Cash Windfalls     
   
Capital Expenditures 19%  
Increase in Working Capital  1%  
Acquisitions 13%  
Repayment of Debt 21%  
Dividends 9%  
Share Repurchases 11%  
Tax 6%  
Increase in Cash Holdings 20%  
  
Appendix A-6: Correlations of Main Variables 
 
This table provides pairwise correlations of the main variables in the data set. The variables are defined in Appendix A-1 and descriptive statistics reported in Appendix A-4. Correlations are 
calculated based on observations at the business-unit-quarter.  
 
 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) 
Sales  (1) 1.00                
EBIT/Total Assets (2) 0.33 1.00               
Sales Growth (3) 0.10 0.24 1.00              
Cash Flow from Operations/Total Assets (4) 0.33 0.77 0.45 1.00             
Capital Expenditures/Total Assets (5) 0.04 0.34 0.14 0.36 1.00            
R&D Expenditures/Total Assets (6) -0.32 -0.54 0.03 -0.35 -0.06 1.00           
Marketing Expenditures/Total Assets (7) -0.17 -0.06 0.22 0.14 0.27 0.71 1.00          
Imputed Tobin's Q (8) -0.12 -0.27 0.02 -0.24 -0.31 0.27 0.11 1.00         
Career at the Firm (9) 0.47 0.18 -0.04 0.17 0.28 -0.22 0.01 -0.39 1.00        
CEO Similarity (10) 0.19 0.05 -0.03 0.07 0.29 -0.06 0.02 -0.63 0.73 1.00       
Power Index (11) 0.36 0.13 -0.04 0.13 0.31 -0.16 0.02 -0.54 0.94 0.92 1.00      
Networker (12) -0.20 0.26 0.04 0.20 0.34 -0.15 0.08 -0.20 0.22 0.07 0.16 1.00     
Division CEO Connection (13) 0.09 0.27 0.03 0.25 0.36 -0.20 0.09 -0.49 0.42 0.38 0.43 0.50 1.00    
Connected Networker (14) -0.04 0.30 0.04 0.26 0.41 -0.20 0.10 -0.42 0.39 0.29 0.37 0.81 0.91 1.00   
External Director  (15) 0.36 0.20 -0.07 0.08 -0.19 -0.48 -0.59 -0.13 0.17 0.07 0.13 -0.44 -0.02 -0.22 1.00  
Elite University  (16) 0.40 0.18 -0.05 0.07 -0.17 -0.50 -0.62 -0.12 0.16 0.02 0.10 -0.35 0.02 -0.15 0.95 1.00 
 
  
Appendix A-7: Capital Budgeting Process over Time and Available Data 
 
This figure presents a time-line of the processes behind the allocation of capital. It also reports the periods for which we have data available. A detailed verbal description of the allocation process 
is provided in Appendix A-3. 
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Appendix A-8: Performance, Capital Allocation, and Managerial Ability 
          
This table presents OLS regressions for the twenty business units of the conglomerate. The dependent variable (shown in the first 
row) in regressions (1) and (2) is  a business unit’s quarterly sales growth and in regressions (3) and (4) a business unit’s quarterly 
planned capital expenditures over its total assets over the period from 01/2002 to 12/2006. Regressions (1) and (3) include Elite 
University as controls. Regressions (2) and (4) include External Director as controls. All regressions also control for: Personnel/Total 
Assets; Cash Flow from Operations/Total Assets; Capital Expenditures/Total Assets (lag); Fourth-Quarter Dummy; R&D 
Expenditures/Total Assets; Marketing Expenditures/Total Assets; Sales; Planned EBIT/Total Assets (lag); Planned Personnel/Total 
Assets; Planned Sales Growth; EBIT Deviations from Plan/Total Assets (lag); and a constant (not shown). The number of business-
unit quarters and business units in each regression are reported at the bottom of the table. Robust standard errors, clustered at 
business-unit level, are shown in brackets. All dependent variables and controls are Winsorized at 1%. Detailed definitions of each 
variable are provided in Appendix A-1. *** indicates significance at 1%, ** indicates significance at 5%, and * indicates significance 
at 10%. 
 Sales Growth 
Planned Capital 
Expenditure/Total Assets 
  [1] [2] [3] [4] 
     
Elite University  0.0715***  0.0061**  
 [0.0208]  [0.0022]  
External Director  -0.0064  -0.0014 
  [0.0278]  [0.0018] 
Personnel/Total Assets -0.0097 -0.0064   
 [0.0072] [0.0077]   
Cash Flow from Operations/Total Assets 0.4055** 0.3503**   
 [0.1517] [0.1622]   
Capital Expenditures/Total Assets (lag) -4.1002** -4.5186***   
 [1.4565] [1.4077]   
Fourth-Quarter Dummy 0.1967*** 0.2079*** -0.0023** -0.0021** 
 [0.0493] [0.0488] [0.0010] [0.0010] 
R&D Expenditures/Total Assets -1.9871 -2.1000   
 [1.5547] [1.7535]   
Marketing Expenditures/Total Assets 2.6834*** 2.6106***   
 [0.7516] [0.8268]   
Sales 0.0007*** 0.0007***   
 [0.0002] [0.0002]   
Planned EBIT/Total Assets (lag)   0.0290** 0.0321** 
   [0.0110] [0.0116] 
Planned Personnel/Total Assets   0.0005** 0.0005** 
   [0.0002] [0.0002] 
Planned Sales Growth   0.0008 -0.0017 
   [0.0043] [0.0053] 
EBIT Deviation from Plan/Total Assets (lag)   0.0120 0.0017 
   [0.0291] [0.0312] 
     
Business-Unit Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Observations 353 386 209 211 
Number of Business Units 20 20 18 18 
Adjusted R-squared  0.496 0.484 0.094 0.068 
 
  
Appendix A-9: Effects of Managerial Power and Connection for R&D and Marketing Expenditures 
 
This table shows OLS regressions for the twenty business units of the conglomerate. The dependent variable (shown in the first row) in 
Panel A (Panel B) is the quarterly difference between a business unit's actual and planned R&D (Marketing) expenditures over its total 
assets over the period from 01/2002 to 12/2006. We report seven regressions in each panel. The first regression of each panel does not 
include any managerial power index as a control. The following six regressions of each panel successively control for the managerial 
power indices indicated in the second row: Career at the Firm; CEO Similarity; Power Index; Networker; Division CEO Connection; 
and Connected Networker. The last six regressions of each panel also control for the interaction of each of the managerial power indices 
and Ln(1+Cash Windfall). The coefficient of the interaction term and its standard error are multiplied by 1,000. All regressions of each 
panel also control for: Ln(1 + Cash Windfall); Sales Growth; EBIT/Total Assets; EBIT Deviation from Plan/Total Assets (lag); Imputed 
Tobin's Q (lag); Fourth-Quarter Dummy; and a constant (not shown). The number of business-unit quarters and business units in each 
regression are reported at the bottom of the table. Robust standard errors, clustered at business-unit level, are shown in brackets. All 
dependent variables and the controls are Winsorized at 1%. Detailed definitions of each variable are provided in Appendix A-1. *** 
indicates significance at 1%, ** indicates significance at 5%, and * indicates significance at 10%. 
 
Panel A: R&D Expenditures 
 
 Dependent Variable: (R&D Expenditures - Planned R&D Expenditures)/Total Assets  
Managerial Power Variable: None 
Career at 
the Firm 
CEO 
Similarity 
Power 
Index Networker 
Division 
CEO 
Connection 
Connected 
Networker 
  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] 
        
Managerial Power * Ln(1+Cash Windfall)  0.7640 0.9182 0.7344 0.9423 0.4234 1.2261 
  [0.8484] [0.9123] [0.9253] [1.4646] [1.0386] [1.3923] 
Managerial Power  -0.0184 -0.0076 -0.0166 0.0104 0.0050 0.0113 
  [0.0184] [0.0098] [0.0108] [0.0131] [0.0121] [0.0324] 
Ln(1+Cash Windfall)  -0.0002 -0.0003 -0.0005 -0.0003 -0.0002 0.0001 -0.0003 
 [0.0002] [0.0002] [0.0005] [0.0003] [0.0006] [0.0006] [0.0007] 
Sales Growth  0.0135* 0.0127* 0.0130* 0.0130 0.0145 0.0143 
  [0.0066] [0.0063] [0.0063] [0.0080] [0.0082] [0.0083] 
EBIT/Total Assets  -0.0721** -0.0681** -0.0719** -0.0901** -0.0909** -0.0905** 
  [0.0264] [0.0285] [0.0269] [0.0318] [0.0328] [0.0324] 
EBIT Deviation from Plan/Total Assets  (lag)  -0.0037 -0.0206 -0.0132 -0.0016 0.0135 0.0064 
  [0.0576] [0.0426] [0.0563] [0.0480] [0.0506] [0.0509] 
Imputed Tobin's Q  (lag)  -0.0015 0.0036 0.0020 -0.0761 -0.0795 -0.0784 
  [0.0193] [0.0147] [0.0164] [0.1229] [0.1319] [0.1310] 
Fourth-Quarter Dummy  -0.0012 -0.0006 -0.0013 0.0002 -0.0003 -0.0004 
  [0.0018] [0.0016] [0.0017] [0.0019] [0.0020] [0.0021] 
        
Business-Unit Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
        
Observations 211 181 205 181 103 95 95 
Number of Business Units 18 16 18 16 11 10 10 
Adjusted R-squared -0.002 0.046 0.058 0.045 0.078 0.072 0.075 
 
  
 
Appendix A-9 (continued) 
 
 
Panel B: Marketing Expenditures 
 
 Dependent Variable: (Marketing Expenditures - Planned Marketing Expenditures)/Total Assets 
Managerial Power Variable: None 
Career at 
the Firm 
CEO 
Similarity 
Power 
Index Networker 
Division 
CEO 
Connection 
Connected 
Networker 
  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] 
        
Managerial Power * log(1+Cash Windfall)   2.2399 5.1189 4.8517 6.5403 -0.4310 2.6719 
  [2.6102] [4.4259] [4.8850] [5.5746] [3.9678] [5.3792] 
Managerial Power  -0.0506 0.0125 -0.0022 0.0296 -0.0473 -0.1152 
  [0.0737] [0.0099] [0.0241] [0.0241] [0.0473] [0.1048] 
log(1+Cash Windfall) -0.0007 -0.0003 -0.0023 -0.0016 -0.0022 0.0006 -0.0010 
 [0.0008] [0.0008] [0.0022] [0.0019] [0.0023] [0.0016] [0.0022] 
Sales Growth  0.0126* 0.0121* 0.0118* 0.0194 0.0259 0.0274* 
  [0.0065] [0.0058] [0.0064] [0.0139] [0.0142] [0.0145] 
EBIT/Total Assets  0.0557 0.0470 0.0525 0.0404 0.0230 0.0215 
  [0.0435] [0.0326] [0.0403] [0.0541] [0.0533] [0.0542] 
EBIT Deviation from Plan/Total Assets (lag)  -0.2373 -0.2276 -0.2574 -0.2751 -0.1972 -0.1277 
  [0.1658] [0.1428] [0.1821] [0.2120] [0.1880] [0.1294] 
Imputed Tobin's Q  (lag)  -0.0418 -0.0445 -0.0359 -0.3575 -0.3942 -0.4078 
  [0.0444] [0.0334] [0.0283] [0.2894] [0.3102] [0.3192] 
Fourth-Quarter Dummy  -0.0033 -0.0017 -0.0027 -0.0088 -0.0091 -0.0084 
  [0.0041] [0.0029] [0.0036] [0.0061] [0.0061] [0.0066] 
        
Business-Unit Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
        
Observations 359 246 270 242 141 133 133 
Number of Business Units 20 18 20 18 13 12 12 
Adjusted R-squared 0.034 0.100 0.106 0.089 0.076 0.064 0.075 
 
